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ABSTRACT
Essays on Capital and Personal Income Taxation
by
Margaret McKeehan
A principal consideration in evaluating any tax policy is the response of economic
agents, which determines the economic costs and consequences of levying a tax. In
three chapters, I study these responses both theoretically and empirically, extending
the literature examining the impact of the corporate income tax, the interaction be-
tween corporate income taxation and individual-level capital income taxation, and
the labor supply effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Chapter one is a
theoretical exploration of optimal capital income tax reform, focusing on the choice
between source-based and residence-based capital income taxes. By incorporating im-
perfectly mobile capital and allowing for income sheltering, this chapter adds to the
literature by addressing the implications of an increasingly global economy, finding
that capital distortions, not income sheltering, are the primary factors determining
the nature of an optimal capital income tax reform. Chapter two is a project which
studies the factors that affect the desirability of source-based corporate income tax-
ation in a small open economy. Using both analytical derivations and computational
simulations, this chapter formally balances the factors that strongly motivate the use
of corporate income taxation, notably the opportunity to costlessly raise revenue by
taxing firms based in foreign countries that provide foreign tax credits, the need to
limit opportunities for individual income sheltering, and the desire to tax the returns
earned by foreign-owned immobile capital, against those that discourage corporate
income taxation, notably concerns about driving out highly-mobile capital investment
and the availability of alternative opportunities to tax immobile capital directly. In
a calibrated setting, this paper determines the relative importance of these factors,
noting that the extent of foreign-owned immobile capital may be the most important
determinant of optimal corporate tax rates. Chapter three is an empirical study that
investigates the labor supply sensitivity of a group that has received minimal atten-
tion in prior studies: dependent adults. Focusing on the 1993 expansion of the EITC,
this study finds that non-nuclear relatives increased their labor supply in response
to their own newfound EITC eligibility, but that adult children decreased their labor
supply in response to their parents’ expanded credits.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The term income tax is used to describe a variety of alternative tax systems, which
can vary in their definitions of taxable income, tax rate structures, and method of
administration. For example, taxable income could alternatively be defined as wage
income, income from financial investments (capital income), lottery winnings, or all
of these in a single comprehensive income tax. The motivations for alternative forms
of income taxation similarly vary, with tax liability possibly reflecting the value of
government services received or financial ability to pay. Despite these alternative mo-
tivations, economic evaluation has increasingly moved towards one method of com-
parison — evaluating taxes in terms of their effects on social welfare, where social
welfare is an aggregate measure of individual utilities. This evaluation technique has
become increasingly popular because of its theoretical clarity and defensibility; eco-
nomic changes only affect the choice of a preferred tax if they matter to individuals.
However, this method of evaluation requires extensive understanding of how taxes
interact with the economy and the associated distortions of individual and firm de-
cisions. Recognizing the increasing need for a comprehensive understanding of these
interactions and distortions, this dissertation studies the effects of two alternative
types of income taxation: capital income taxation and personal income taxation.
Understanding the effects of any tax requires a mix of methodologies. Theory
identifies the potential effects of various taxes and empirics identify evidence of these
effects. In combination, theory and empirics can inform policy makers, guiding choice
of an optimal tax system. Each chapter of this dissertation seeks to highlight the ef-
fects of income taxation and support informed policy making. The first essay directly
2compares two alternative approaches to capital income taxation, using a theoretical
model to understand how globalization affects the choice between a source-based and
residence-based capital income tax. The second essay focuses on source-based capital
income taxation, using a theoretical model to understand how a variety of economic
conditions affect the overall desirability of a source-based capital income tax. The
last essay focuses on personal income taxation, empirically studying how the U.S.
Personal Income Tax affects the labor supply of dependent adult individuals. In com-
bination, these essays inform our understanding of the effects and optimal structure
of income taxation.
The first essay, How Should We Tax Capital Income? Optimality Under Policy
Constraints in a Global Economy, compares source-based and residence-based capi-
tal income taxation, focusing on how globalization affects their relative desirability.
Both of these taxes apply to the return on capital investment, but the definition of a
taxable return varies significantly between approaches. Under a source-based capital
income tax, the return on investment produced within a region is taxed regardless of
the investor. Consequently, these taxes are typically levied at the firm level; corporate
income taxes are a common example of source-based taxation. Under a residence-
based capital income tax, the return to capital is taxed for individuals based on their
region of residence regardless of where the investment is made. Consequently, these
taxes are typically levied at the individual level; capital gains taxes are a common
example of residence-based taxation. These are the two most common approaches
to taxing capital income, and their relative optimality has been addressed (e.g. Bu-
covetsky and Wilson, 1991; Lejour and Verbon, 1998). I add to this literature in
two ways. First, I incorporate income sheltering opportunities at both the individual
level and the firm level. Second, I allow the optimizing government to rely on a mix
of these two approaches, potentially levying both taxes simultaneously.1 With these
1This reflects common practice. For example, the U.S. tax code includes both a corporate income
tax (a variant of a source-based capital income tax) and capital gains taxes in the personal income
tax systems (a variant of a residence-based capital income tax).
3considerations incorporated I focus on how globalization, modeled as a combination of
increasingly mobile capital and increased opportunities for income sheltering, affects
the optimal balance between approaches.
The two attributes of globalization have very different implications for the choice
between source-based and residence-based capital income taxation. Increases in in-
come sheltering opportunities have ambiguous effects on optimal tax rates, even if the
opportunities are asymmetrically available to firms and individuals. On the one hand,
sheltering activity is costly and non-productive, and decreasing the relevant tax rate
can mitigate this socially inefficient behavior. On the other hand, sheltering activity
decreases effective tax rates and reduces the primary economic distortions associated
with taxation (e.g., changes in the location of an investment to avoid source-based
taxes). These tradeoffs produce indefinite recommendations for responding to in-
creases in income sheltering. In contrast, increasingly mobile capital makes the two
alternative approaches to capital income taxation increasingly distinct. When capital
is perfectly immobile (when all domestic saving is invested domestically and all do-
mestic investments are owned by domestic individuals), each of these capital income
taxes have the same base and primary economic effects. However, as capital mobil-
ity increases, the strength of the association between these two taxes declines and
the economic effects become more distinct. Source-based taxes distort the location
of investment, since the taxes are applied to all investment made within a region.
Residence-based taxes distort savings decisions and the timing of consumption, since
individuals pay taxes on the return to saving regardless of where they invest. Since
the economic effects of these two approaches become more distinct in an increasingly
global economy, while income sheltering ambiguously affects the relative desirability
of each tax, these results suggest an optimal tax reform will choose the form of tax-
ation based on the estimated economic impacts on investment and savings decisions,
not the differential effects of income sheltering.
The second essay, Balancing Act: Weighing the Factors Affecting the Taxation
4of Capital Income in a Small Open Economy, focuses on the optimal level of capital
income taxation rather than the optimal form and was written in collaboration with
Dr. George Zodrow. Notably, there are several arguments supporting and opposing
source-based capital income taxes in small open economies. To account for these
arguments, the model includes immobile and mobile capital, tax evasion, and the
possibility of residual foreign tax payments. The analytical framework incorporates
these considerations into a simple two-sector model. Sector one is a “domestic”
sector that produces a non-traded good using labor and immobile capital. Sector two
is a “multinational” sector that produces a traded good (with perfect international
substitutability) using labor and mobile capital. Within this context, we incorporate
two tax instruments, a capital income tax and a lump-sum head tax, which are
used to finance government purchases of the traded good. To solve for the optimal
capital income tax policy, we assume a single representative resident with inelastic
labor supply and identify the taxes that maximize this individual’s welfare. In the
analytical setting this produces a few key insights: (1) Zero capital income taxation
is only optimal if all location-specific capital is owned domestically and there is no
residual taxation; and (2) If all of the capital income earned by the multinational firm
is subject to residual taxation, the optimal capital tax rate is at least as great as the
residual tax rate.
The computational model in this study expands on the one described above in
several ways. First, the individual’s problem is extended to account for endogenous
labor. This allows us to convert the head tax to a proportional tax on labor, and
permits the possibility of endogenous labor income shifting to the capital income tax
base. Second, we add another input in both production sectors: perfectly mobile
“ordinary” capital, whose fixed rate of return is determined by international markets.
This implies that domestic production also includes internationally mobile capital, so
that both production sectors might be affected by capital flight. Finally, we add an
explicit tax on location-specific capital as an additional tax instrument available to
5the government. Calibrating this model so that it aligns with empirical observations,
we highlight the relative importance of several economic factors. First, the optimal
capital income tax rate increases proportionally with the amount of foreign-owned
immobile capital, and may exceed the tax rate on labor income. However, if immo-
bile capital is not foreign-owned, optimal rates are not very sensitive to the balance
between immobile and mobile capital. Second, any foreign residual taxation provides
a strong rationale for capital income taxation. Third, the optimal capital income
tax rate increases with the opportunities for labor income shifting unless the capital
income tax rate exceeds the labor income tax rate. Fourth, optimal capital income
tax rates fall significantly if an alternative tax is available which targets immobile
capital; for example, in the resource sector, this could be a separate resource rent
tax. Finally, the optimal capital income tax is only slightly affected by international
income shifting due to the several offsetting effects generated by international income
sheltering. In combination, these observations highlight the complexity involved in
the choice of an optimal capital income tax rate. However, in the absence of an
instrument that can directly tax immobile capital, positive capital income taxation
appears to be generally desirable.
The third and final essay, The EITC and the Labor Supply of Adult Dependents:
Direct Effects and Family Income Effects, empirically measures the labor supply re-
sponses of adult dependents to changes in the tax code. To be claimed as a dependent,
an adult must have very low income (earning less than $3,950 in 2014), and rely on
family members for the majority of their financial support. Tax data suggests the size
of this population has been growing. Between 1992 and 2012, the ratio of dependent
claims to the total number of returns filed more than doubled, ignoring children under
the age of 18 or under the age of 24 and in school, reaching a maximum of nearly 15
million individuals in 2011 (IRS Statistics of Income 1992–2012). While this suggests
an increasing number of adult dependents, it is less clear how tax policy affects this
growing population. This paper takes a first step towards answering this question by
6providing evidence on how dependents responded to the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) expansions of mid-1990s.
For dependents, the EITC expansion had two primary impacts. Most significantly,
starting in 1994, individuals without dependent children could claim the EITC. This
extension followed the general structure used for all EITC schedules: a credit which
increases over very low wage earnings, plateaus to a constant value, and then is
phased-out as earned income continues to increase. However, the credit amount
available to childless individuals ($306) was significantly smaller than that available
for individuals with dependent children ($2,038). Additionally, the value of the EITC
increased for any eligible primary filers, particularly if the primary filers claimed
EITC-qualifying children. These two changes to the EITC have conflicting expected
effects on dependent labor supply. The first change, which made adult dependents
newly eligible for the EITC, is expected to increase their labor force participation
since it increases the return to labor. The second change, which expanded family
credits, is expected to decrease their labor force participation as long as it led to
an overall increase in family income which would be shared with the dependent. In
combination, the expected net effect of the EITC expansion is ambiguous.
To estimate and decompose the net effect of the EITC expansion, I use difference-
in-differences estimation, comparing the labor force participation rates for adult de-
pendents before and after the reform along two separate dividing lines. First, to cap-
ture the overall effect, I compare adult dependents attached to low-income households
to those attached to high-income households. Generally, only dependents attached to
low-income households should be affected by the EITC expansion. If family income
is high, the family will not be eligible for the EITC and will always optimally choose
to claim the dependent (forgoing any individual EITC credits). Using this compari-
son, I find that non-nuclear family members increased their labor force participation
by about 5 percentage points in response the EITC expansion. However, I do not
find robust evidence for a response among adult children or parents of the household
7head. Second, to decompose this response, I compare adult dependents attached to
low-income households with young children to those without. Since the EITC in-
crease was considerably larger for families with young children (under 18 or under 24
and in school), this comparison isolates the effect of increased family credits. Using
this comparison, I find that adult children attached families with young children rel-
atively decreased their labor force participation after the reform. This suggests that
the absence of a net response for adult children may be a consequence of the two
contradictory effects of the EITC, rather than an insensitivity to tax changes.
While the essays of this dissertation rely on a breadth of methodological ap-
proaches, they share a common goal: clarification of the effects of alternative income
tax systems. The first essay theoretically identifies how the effects of capital income
taxation vary with the form of the tax, contrasting source-based and residence-based
capital income taxes in the context of increasing globalization. The second essay,
which also relies on theoretical modeling, identifies the welfare effects of capital in-
come taxation, assuming a source-based approach. The third and final essay, which
employs empirical estimation, studies the practical effects of wage subsidies, focus-
ing on adult dependents participating in complex family structures. Collectively this
research illustrates the variety of ways economic analysis can contribute to the deter-
mination of socially beneficial tax policies.
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How Should We Tax Capital Income? Optimality
Under Policy Constraints in a Global Economy
In a closed economy without international trade or cross-border capital flows,
the distinction between capital income taxation at the firm level and the individ-
ual level is primarily administrative; both taxes distort inter-temporal consumption
and investment decisions equivalently. However, in a small economy open to interna-
tional trade the two taxes can have quite different effects on saving and investment.
Capital income taxation at the firm level (generally referred to as source-based tax-
ation) effectively taxes all capital income earned on domestic investments by both
residents and non-residents, inducing capital flight and lowering the return to do-
mestically supplied labor (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1983; Gordon, 1986; Razin and
Sadka, 1991). Capital income taxation at the individual level (generally referred to
as residence-based taxation) taxes all capital income earned by domestic residents,
whether earned domestically or abroad, and thus distorts inter-temporal consumption
decisions (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976; Judd, 1985; Chamley, 1986), but not the loca-
tion of investment. Since the effects of these taxes become more disparate as capital
mobility increases, an increasingly open economy makes the choice between these two
taxes increasingly important. Additionally, opportunities for income sheltering may
further differentiate the impact of the two taxes, particularly when these tax avoid-
ance opportunities vary between firms and individuals. In this paper, I construct an
analytical model that simultaneously incorporates savings decisions, individual and
corporate income sheltering opportunities, and varying degrees of capital mobility.
With this model I examine the combined effects of these factors in an open econ-
9omy setting. I find that while differences in sheltering opportunities and behavior
determine the choice between source-based and residence-based taxation in closed
economies, increasingly elastic international capital flows complicate the choice be-
tween the two forms of capital income taxation, especially since the effects of increased
income sheltering are indeterminate: Increased sheltering increases the inefficiency of
capital income taxation, but simultaneously lowers the effective tax wedge generated
by taxation. Another implication of the analysis is that increasingly global markets
justify renewed attention to the key parameters which determine the efficiency cost of
each form of capital income taxation, such as inter-temporal elasticities of substitution
and production cost shares of capital.
While increasingly global markets introduce a variety of economic changes, this
paper focuses on two primary considerations: increasingly mobile capital investments
and increased income sheltering opportunities. Both considerations have led to in-
tensified scrutiny of capital income taxation internationally, and most recent reform
proposals focus on ways to limit capital flight and reduce income sheltering opportuni-
ties and incentives. Proposals focusing on international income sheltering frequently
recommend a shift away from firm-level taxation toward individual-level taxation
(e.g., Toder and Viard, forthcoming; Graetz and Warren, forthcoming; and Grubert
and Altshuler, forthcoming) and implicitly suggest that sheltering opportunities are
more abundant at the firm level. However, studies of income sheltering reflect com-
plex efficiency implications for capital income taxation. Slemrod and Wilson (2009)
show that tax havens reduce welfare in non-haven countries because sheltering op-
portunities induce two non-productive, costly activities — firm income sheltering
and government enforcement — and raise the cost of generating revenue, discourag-
ing public good expenditure. In contrast, Hong and Smart (2010) emphasize how
opportunities for income sheltering may reduce the real tax elasticity of capital in-
vestment since sheltering mitigates the costs of relatively high tax rates, leading to
an increase in social welfare in some cases. By explicitly modeling income sheltering
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opportunities in the derivations below, I am able to capture these trade-offs and de-
velop a more comprehensive picture of how sheltering opportunities affect the choice
between source-based and residence-based capital income taxation.
The implications of increasingly mobile capital are less ambiguous — mobile capi-
tal increases the capital flight associated with source-based taxation, while decreasing
the associated distortion of inter-temporal consumption decisions. In an analytical
framework, it is typically simplest to assume either a closed economy (with no capital
mobility) or a small open economy (with perfectly mobile capital). In practice, no
economy is either completely open or closed. As Zodrow (2010 p. 890) writes, “There
is general agreement that capital is mobile and has become increasingly mobile over
time... There is, however, far less agreement as to whether capital is sufficiently
mobile that it is reasonable to assume perfect international capital mobility.” For
simplicity, I model the semi-open economy by making foreign investment costly for
the domestic resident (Lejour and Verbon (1998) use a similar assumption). Inclu-
sion of a foreign investment cost creates both a preference for domestic investment,
generating the “home bias” noted by French and Poterba (1991), and a correlation
between domestic saving and domestic investment, a pattern noted by Feldstein and
Horioka (1980).1 More importantly, I allow the foreign-investment cost to be ad-
justable, with a decreasing cost reflecting an increasingly open economy. This allows
direct observation of how capital mobility and other considerations interact to affect
the optimal balance between source-based and residence-based taxation.
In order to focus on capital market effects and keep the analysis tractable, I do not
incorporate several features of an open economy in my model. First, I assume that all
domestically produced goods are perfect substitutes for international goods, a sim-
plifying assumption that eliminates the complication of domestic commodity price
1Both of these puzzles have led to extensive literatures seeking to explain or refute these observa-
tions. See Apergis and Tsoumas (2009) and Zodrow (2010) for reviews of the literature addressing
the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle and Coeurdacier and Rey (2012) for a review of explanations for the
French-Poterba Home Bias puzzle.
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effects. Gravelle and Smetters (2006) study the implications of imperfect substi-
tutability between domestic and foreign goods, showing that limited substitutability
mitigates the capital flight associated with source-based taxation and, consequently,
the share of the tax burden borne by domestic labor. Second, I do not consider the
impact of increasingly mobile labor. Wilson (1995) and Brueckner (2000) both in-
corporate mobile labor into models of capital income tax competition, and show that
source-based capital income taxes still lower the level of domestic capital investment,
leading to inefficiently low source-based tax rates and under-provision of the public
good.
One challenge in studying the choice between residence-based and source-based
taxation is that both taxes are generally regarded as inefficient. As long as capital is
internationally mobile, source-based capital income taxation distorts the location of
investment. As demonstrated in Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1983), Gordon (1986), and
Razin and Sadka (1991), this distortion is fully borne by immobile factors, implying
direct taxation of immobile factors is more efficient. Similarly, as implied by Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976) and extended in Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), residence-
based capital income taxation that reduces the individual’s return on investment is
inefficient relative to optimal non-linear labor taxation since it distorts inter-temporal
consumption decisions.
Nevertheless, several papers have highlighted cases where some capital income
taxation is optimal, even when classically efficient taxes are available. The literature
supporting non-zero residence-based taxation of capital income is unusually prolific
and is surveyed by Kaplow (2008). Generally, these studies fall in one of three cate-
gories: models that relax the standard assumptions regarding individual preferences
(e.g., Erosa and Gervais, 2002; Saez, 2002), models that relax market behavior as-
sumptions (e.g., Hubbard and Judd, 1986; Naito, 1999; Cremer, Pestieau, and Rochet,
2001), and models that acknowledge policy limitations (e.g., Boadway and Pestieau,
2003). This paper eschews imposing restrictions on individual preferences and con-
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sequently reflects the observation of Erosa and Gervais (2002): The efficiency cost of
residence-based capital income taxation falls as the complementarity of consumption
and leisure increases with age. However, I do not consider heterogeneous individuals,
and thus do not model the factors supporting residence-based taxation noted in Saez
(2002; heterogeneous tastes) or Cremer, Pestieau, and Rochet (2001; heterogeneous
endowments).
As with residence-based taxation, some special cases may make non-zero source-
based capital income taxation desirable. If a portion of the domestic capital stock is
immobile, the distortion associated with source-based taxation is reduced and, if this
capital is owned by non-residents, source-based capital taxation becomes especially
attractive from the perspective of domestic residents and may be optimal even when
efficient taxes are available (e.g., head taxes). Huizinga and Nielson (1997) further
extend this intuition to the case where foreign firms earn above-normal returns on
investment. The case for taxing immobile investments is strengthened if relatively mo-
bile capital has easier access to income sheltering opportunities. In this case, income
sheltering increases the portion of the burden born by immobile factors and reduces
the marginal distortion associated with source-based taxation (Gugl and Zodrow,
2006; Hong and Smart, 2010). Even when all capital is perfectly mobile, some source-
based capital income taxation may be justified. Notably, source-based capital income
taxation may act as a tax on labor income that is disguised as small-business capital
income, both generating revenue and deterring costly sheltering behavior (Gordon
and Mackie-Mason, 1995). Consequently, neither form of capital income taxation is
universally inefficient, even though special economic characteristics may be necessary
to justify a non-zero rate.
Rather than justifying either form of taxation, this paper is intended to illuminate
the choice between the two forms of capital income taxation with increasingly open
markets. To achieve this, I include a fixed capital income revenue requirement and
study the optimal balance between residence-based and source-based capital income
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taxation. By incorporating inter-temporal consumption decisions, imperfectly mobile
capital investment, and income shifting behavior, I am able to capture the primary
costs and benefits associated with both approaches.
In the following section I describe the basic analytical model used throughout
the paper, a model that does not assign functional forms but does assume constant
returns to scale in production and perfect substitutability between domestic and
foreign goods. Section III derives the equilibrium marginal responses to capital income
taxation. Section IV uses these responses to evaluate the optimal balance between
source-based and residence-based capital income taxation in a small open economy.
Section V performs similar derivations for the partially open economy, comparing
the results to Section IV and highlighting how globalization amplifies the distinction
between the two forms of capital income taxation. Section VI concludes.
2.1 An Overlapping Generations Model of Capital Income
Taxation
2.1.1 The Individual’s Problem
In this economy a new individual is born every period and lives for two periods,
making labor supply and consumption decisions in each period. In every period t, the
labor supply of the age s individual, hst , is limited by a time constraint T
s
t = h
s
t + l
s
t ,
where T st is the total time endowment of an age s individual in period t and l
s
t is
the corresponding hours of leisure. The return to labor finances purchases of the
consumption good in each period, cst . The individual born in period t chooses labor
supply and consumption in each period to maximize lifetime utility
u
(
c1t , l
1
t , c
2
t+1, l
2
t+1
)
, (2.1)
where utility is continuous, increasing, and concave. In period t all labor earns the
same market wage wt, which finances consumption at price pt. The individual can
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also save some labor income, bt, by purchasing the commodity good and leasing it out
to firms for production.2 These purchases are denoted with kt, so that savings can be
written as bt = ptkt = wth
1
t−ptc1t . In the following period these leases earn a gross rate
of return ρt+1 > 0, which, in the absence of income sheltering behavior, is subject to
the residence-based tax rate τI . However, if the individual is saving (bt > 0) and the
residence-based tax rate is positive (τI > 0), the individual can shelter a share φ
I
t+1 of
the return at a cost zI
(
φIt+1
)
ρt+1bt, where z
I (·) is an increasing, convex function of
φIt+1 such that z
I(0) = 0.3’4 The optimizing individual chooses the fraction sheltered
to maximize the after-sheltering cost, after-tax return to savings
ρNt+1 = ρt+1
[
φIt+1 + (1− τI)
(
1− φIt+1
)− zI (φIt+1)] , (2.2)
which implies
∂zI
∂φIt+1
= τI . (2.3)
That is, the individual will shelter income until the marginal sheltering cost equals
the statutory tax rate. Under this formulation, the cost of income sheltering is
stated generally enough to account for any foreign tax payments if income is shel-
tered abroad. For example, suppose the cost of sheltering can be decomposed as
zI
(
φIt
)
= zI1
(
φIt
)
+ τFI φ
I
t , where τ
F
I is the foreign tax rate and z
I1
(
φIt
)
is the direct
cost of sheltering income. In this case, (2.3) can be written as ∂zI1/∂φIt = τI − τFI
and the firm shelters income until the marginal direct sheltering cost equals the in-
ternational tax rate differential.
2These firms may be foreign or domestic, depending on the specification of the model.
3I do not model the recipient of these costs. Implicitly, this suggests that the cost of sheltering
is paid to an agent outside of the domestic economy.
4I assume that the cost of income sheltering is linear with respect to the value of the representative
individual’s capital income, ρt+1bt, because the value generated by sheltering is also linear with
respect to the individual’s return. That is, the value of sheltering is φIt+1τIρt+1bt. By assuming that
both terms have a linear relationship, I ensure that the optimal level of sheltering is not affected by
the aggregate level of saving in the economy. A similar assumption is imposed for firm-level income
sheltering.
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Accounting for optimal individual sheltering behavior, the individual born in pe-
riod t is subject to the lifetime budget constraint
wth
1
t − ptc1t +
wt+1h
2
t+1 − pt+1c2t+1
1 + ρNt+1
≥ 0. (2.4)
Defining discounted prices and wages as pDt+1 = pt+1/
(
1 + ρNt+1
)
and wDt+1 = wt+1/
(
1 + ρNt+1
)
,
the utility-maximizing individual born in period t chooses consumption and leisure
such that the first-order conditions
uc1 − αtpt = 0 (2.5)
uc2 − αtpDt+1 = 0 (2.6)
ul1 − αtwt = 0 (2.7)
ul2 − αtwDt+1 = 0 (2.8)
wth
1
t − ptc1t + wDt+1h2t+1 − pDt+1c2t+1 = 0 (2.9)
hold, where αt indicates the marginal utility of income for the individual born in
period t. Letting {c1∗t , l1∗t , c2∗t+1, l2∗t+1} denote the optimal choices of consumption and
leisure for the individual given prices and taxes, the indirect utility function for the
individual born in year t is
V t
(
wt, w
D
t+1, pt, p
D
t+1
)
= u
(
c1
∗
t , l
1∗
t , c
2∗
t+1, l
2∗
t+1
)
. (2.10)
2.1.2 The Firm’s Problem
At time t the domestic firm produces a quantity of the consumption good, Xt,
using capital, Kt, and domestically supplied labor, Lt. The firm’s production function
F (Kt, Lt) is increasing with respect to both inputs and exhibits constant returns to
scale. Inputs are chosen to maximize profits given each factor’s cost: the wage rate,
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wt, and the product of domestically required rate of return to capital, r
d
t , and the
capital price in the period of purchase pt−1. The source-based capital income tax τF
is levied on all equity-financed capital, where an initial portion φF1t of capital is debt-
financed and effectively exempt from the source-based capital income tax. The firm
can debt finance or otherwise shelter an additional portion of capital, φF2t , at a cost
zF
(
φF2t
)
rdt pt−1Kt. Similar to the individual sheltering cost function, this sheltering
cost formulation is general enough to incorporate any foreign tax payments. The firm
chooses the level of sheltering to minimize the cost of capital
rGt = r
d
t
[
1 + τF − τF
(
φF1t + φ
F2
t
)
+ zF
(
φF2t
)]
, (2.11)
so that
∂zF
∂φF2t
= τF . (2.12)
That is, the firm will increase its rate of equity finance until the marginal cost of equity
finance (or income sheltering) is as great as the statutory source-based capital income
tax rate. Note that without changing the specification of the model, increased equity
finance could be alternatively be interpreted as income sheltering activity, where the
firm spends on zF
(
φF2t
)
to shelter income from the source-based tax. Accounting for
the optimal level of debt finance and income sheltering, the firm’s profit maximization
problem can be written as
max
Kt,Lt
{
ptF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt − rGt pt−1Kt
}
, (2.13)
which implies the profit-maximizing firm chooses capital and labor such that
ptFKt − rGt pt−1 = 0 (2.14)
ptFLt − wt = 0. (2.15)
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2.1.3 Market Clearing Conditions
While firm and individual responses to prices are unaffected by the “openness”
of the economy, the market clearing conditions can vary significantly between small
open and partially open economies. However, a few market clearing conditions are
unaffected by the degree of capital mobility. First, throughout this paper all labor
used in domestic production must be supplied domestically. Assuming that the pop-
ulation of the domestic economy is constant, this means the labor supply at time t is
given by
Lt = h
1
t + h
2
t . (2.16)
This assumption was made to reflect the relative immobility of labor in comparison to
capital. Relaxing 2.16 to allow for imperfectly mobile labor can mitigate some of the
capital flight associated with source-based capital income taxation, but introduces
new margins of distortion (Burbidge and Myers 1994). Indeed, with mobile labor,
either tax could affect migration decisions for individuals — individuals could leave
the country to avoid residence-based taxes or the wage reductions generated by source-
based taxes. Due to the complication introduced by these additional distortions, I
leave this consideration for future research.
Second, I assume that there is an internationally-produced perfect substitute for
the domestic good, so that the market clearing price for the consumption good is
fixed,
∂pt
∂τI
=
∂pt
∂τF
= 0. (2.17)
This assumption is likely extreme, particularly in the case of a partially open econ-
omy and in the presence of non-traded goods, but allows me to focus on the role of
increasingly mobile capital investment.5
Since the consumption price is set by international markets, the evolution of prices
5Gravelle and Smetters (2006) provide an extensive discussion of the incidence implications of
internationally substitutable goods.
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in this economy is also set internationally,
pt+1
pt
= qt. (2.18)
Of course, if the consumption good is storable and qt > 1 + ρ
N
t , this generates a
natural income sheltering mechanism. If prices increase at a rate exceeding the net
return to saving, an individual could simply purchase and store a good for future
resale, avoiding taxes on interest income and earning a greater return. For simplicity,
I assume that the residence-based tax applies to any asset appreciation on an accrual
basis, so that the rate of return to saving provided in (2.2) characterizes the marginal
return to all savings mechanisms, including storable goods.
Finally, since this model does not consider barriers to entry, the firm always earns
zero profits in equilibrium,
ptF (Kt, Lt) = wtLt + r
G
t pt−1Kt. (2.19)
The remaining capital market clearing conditions vary significantly with the model-
ing assumptions, and are presented along with the derivation and discussion of the
optimal tax results.
2.1.4 The Steady State
In the derivations below, tax choices are optimized in the steady state. For sim-
plicity, I ignore growth and characterize the steady state by a constant population
coupled with constant levels of consumption and leisure. The individual’s optimality
conditions (2.5)-(2.9) imply, in the steady state,
pt+1
pt
=
wt+1
wt
=
αt
αt+1
= qt (2.20)
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and
ρNt+1 = ρ
N
t . (2.21)
While I do not require that the marginal revenue product of capital (rdt ) equals the
market-clearing interest rate (ρt), I do assume that as long as ρt is constant, then r
d
t
is as well.6 This leaves the growth rate for only two variables undefined: Xt and Kt.
If firm production is also constant — an assumption consistent with applying similar
steady state restrictions to the rest of the world — then the size of capital stock (Kt)
will also be constant, although the value (pt−1Kt) is increasing with all other prices.
2.2 Optimal Tax Conditions and Market Responses
To understand the trade-offs generated by the choice between residence-based
and source-based capital income taxation, I assume the government must raise an
exogenous amount of revenue Rt, which is rising with prices, using only the two
capital income tax instruments: a residence-based tax on individual capital income
(τI) and a source-based tax on the return to business capital (τF ). Effectively, this
means the government’s selection of each tax is constrained by
τF
(
1− φF1t − φF2t
)
rdt pt−1Kt + τI
(
1− φIt
)
ρtbt−1 ≥ Rt. (2.22)
Using the individual’s indirect utility function as defined in (2.10) and denoting φF1+
φF2 = φF , welfare maximization in the steady state satisfies
max
τI ,τF
{
V
(
w,wD, p, pD
) ∣∣∣∣τF (1− φF )(rdpKq
)
+ τI
(
1− φI)(ρb
q
)
≥ R
}
. (2.23)
Since the individual’s utility is strictly increasing in both consumption and leisure, the
optimal mix of residence-based and source-based capital income taxes, using Roy’s
6In this model rdt = ρt only if the economy is completely closed. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 address the
relationship between rdt and ρt in the perfectly open and partially open economies, respectively.
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Identity and the fixed-price condition (2.17), is characterized by three first-order
conditions
αwh1
(
1
w
∂w
∂τF
)
+ αwDh2
(
1
wD
∂wD
∂τF
)
− αpDc2
(
1
pD
∂pD
∂τF
)
(2.24)
+λτF
[
rd
(
1− φF ) pK
q
](
1
τF
+
1
rd
∂rd
∂τF
+
1
K
∂K
∂τF
+
1
1− φF
∂φF2
∂τF
)
+λτI
[
ρ
(
1− φI) b
q
](
1
ρ
∂ρ
∂τF
+
1
b
∂b
∂τF
+
1
1− φI
∂φI
∂τF
)
= 0
αwh1
(
1
w
∂w
∂τI
)
+ αwDh2
(
1
wD
∂wD
∂τI
)
− αpDc2
(
1
pD
∂pD
∂τI
)
(2.25)
+λτF
[
rd
(
1− φF ) pK
q
](
1
rd
∂rd
∂τI
+
1
K
∂K
∂τI
+
1
1− φF
∂φF2
∂τI
)
+λτI
[
ρ
(
1− φI) b
q
](
1
τI
+
1
ρ
∂ρ
∂τI
+
1
b
∂b
∂τI
+
1
1− φI
∂φI
∂τI
)
= 0
τF r
d
(
1− φF ) pK + τIρ (1− φI) b = qR, (2.26)
where λ is the marginal value of relaxing the government budget constraint. Generally,
these conditions balance the cost of distorting individual and firm behavior with
the amount of revenue raised by each tax. The implications of these conditions
vary considerably with the degree of “openess” in the economy. To highlight these
differences, I start by deriving the general expressions for the market responses to each
form of taxation. Then, using the capital market clearing assumptions associated with
either a small open economy or a partially open economy, I refine these optimality
conditions for more detailed interpretation.
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2.2.1 Market Responses to Taxation
To solve for the market responses to the either tax, I start by differentiating the
production function and applying the first-order conditions (2.14) and (2.15)
1
Xt
∂Xt
∂τ
= θKt
(
1
Kt
∂Kt
∂τ
)
+ θLt
(
1
Lt
∂Lt
∂τ
)
, (2.27)
where θLt is the production cost share of labor, θKt is the production cost share of
capital, and τ can indicate either τF or τI . Similarly, differentiating the zero-profit
condition (2.19) and applying the fixed price condition (2.17) gives
1
Xt
∂Xt
∂τ
= θLt
(
1
wt
∂wt
∂τ
+
1
Lt
∂Lt
∂τ
)
+ θKt
(
1
rGt
∂rGt
∂τ
+
1
Kt
∂Kt
∂τ
)
. (2.28)
Combining the two equilibrium response functions (2.27) and (2.28) suggests the tax
semi-elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the either capital income tax is
1
wt
∂wt
∂τ
= −θKt
θLt
(
1
rGt
∂rGt
∂τ
)
. (2.29)
Since the individual discounts second-period prices by 1 + ρNt+1, (2.29) implies the
change in the perceived second-period wage is
1
wDt+1
∂wDt+1
∂τ
= −θKt+1
θLt+1
(
1
rGt+1
∂rGt+1
∂τ
)
− 1
1 + ρNt+1
∂ρNt+1
∂τ
. (2.30)
Similarly, the perceived response of the second-period consumption price is
1
pDt+1
∂pDt+1
∂τ
= − 1
1 + ρNt+1
∂ρNt+1
∂τ
. (2.31)
With these price responses determined, we can turn to the response of domestic
capital investment. To derive the change in investment start with the per-unit cost
22
function Ct = wt(Lt/Xt) + r
G
t pt−1(Kt/Xt), which is defined so that
CKt =
∂Ct
∂rNt pt−1
=
Kt
Xt
. (2.32)
Since production is assumed to follow constant returns to scale, application of Euler’s
homogeneous function theorem implies the response of per-unit capital demand is
1
CKt
∂CKt
∂τ
= σθLt
(
1
wt
∂wt
∂τ
− 1
rGt
∂rGt
∂τ
)
, (2.33)
where σ is the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution in production. Applying the
wage response (2.29) and the definition in (2.32), (2.33) becomes
1
Kt
∂Kt
∂τ
− 1
Xt
∂Xt
∂τ
= −σ
(
1
rGt
∂rGt
∂τ
)
. (2.34)
Combining this with the differentiated production function (2.27) gives
1
Kt
∂Kt
∂τ
= − σ
θLt
(
1
rGt
∂rGt
∂τ
)
+
1
Lt
∂Lt
∂τ
. (2.35)
The first term in this expression is the factor substitution effect. If a tax raises
the cost of capital in production, the firm’s capital/labor ratio will fall, where the
magnitude of this effect is driven by the elasticity of substitution in production,
σ, and the cost share of capital in production, θKt = 1 − θLt . The second term
reflects the fact that the individual’s labor supply response also affects domestic
capital investment in equilibrium. While not written directly here for brevity, note
that the labor response to the wage rate is theoretically ambiguous and the labor
impact on the capital response is also ambiguous. Consequently, it is possible that
the labor supply response will either reinforce or offset the factor substitution effect
in equilibrium.
Finally, the conditions characterizing the optimal level of income sheltering at the
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individual level (2.3) imply
∂φIt
∂τF
= 0. (2.36)
That is, individual income sheltering behavior does not respond to the source-based
capital income tax. Similarly, relying on the definition of income sheltering at the
firm level (2.12),
∂φFt
∂τI
= 0. (2.37)
That is, firm income sheltering behavior does not respond to the residence-based
capital income tax.
2.3 Capital Income Taxation in a Small Open Economy
In a small open economy, the pre-tax domestic cost of capital is set by the inter-
nationally required rate of return, rt, which is unaffected by domestic behavior. That
is, in a small open economy
∂rdt
∂τF
=
∂rt
∂τF
=
∂rdt
∂τI
=
∂rt
∂τI
= 0. (2.38)
Since the pre-tax cost of capital is fixed, the gross cost of capital expression (2.11)
gives
1
rGt
∂rGt
∂τF
=
rdt
(
1− φFt
)
rGt
(2.39)
and
1
rGt
∂rGt
∂τI
= 0. (2.40)
That is, only the source-based tax affects the gross cost of capital in a small open
economy. This offers considerable simplification to the market responses above. No-
tably, in a small open economy the wage rate wt is unaffected by the residence-based
tax.7 Further, combining (2.40) with the capital response given in (2.35), the capital
7This is plainly evident by combining (2.29) and (2.40).
24
response to the residence-based tax is proportional to the labor supply response,
1
Kt
∂Kt
∂τI
=
1
Lt
∂Lt
∂τI
. (2.41)
Because a residence-based tax does not distort any of the firm’s prices in a small
open economy, the factor substitution effect is eliminated and the capital-labor ratio
in production is unchanged. However, if the residence-based tax increases (decreases)
labor supply, domestic production increases (decreases) in a corresponding manner.
A second implication of the small open economy assumption of perfectly mobile
capital is that the interest rate for domestic savers (or borrowers) is also unaffected
by domestic behavior,
∂ρt
∂τF
=
∂ρt
∂τI
= 0. (2.42)
Consequently, the net return to saving is unaffected by the source-based tax
1
1 + ρNt
∂ρNt
∂τF
= 0, (2.43)
as well as the individual’s perception of discounted future prices. However, the
residence-based tax rate does affect the net return to saving
1
1 + ρNt+1
∂ρNt+1
∂τI
= −ρt+1
(
1− φIt+1
)
1 + ρNt+1
, (2.44)
and, as a consequence, the discounting of second period prices.
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2.3.1 Optimal Taxation in Small Open Economy
With the full set of prices derived, the optimality conditions in (2.24)-(2.26) can
be revised to reflect the assumptions of a small open economy
α
(
wh1 + wh2
) θK
θL
[
rd
(
1− φF )
rG
]
+ λτI
[
ρ
(
1− φI) b
q
](
1
b
∂b
∂τF
)
(2.45)
= λτF
[
rd
(
1− φF ) pK
q
]{
1
τF
− σ
θL
[
rd
(
1− φF )
rG
]
+
1
L
∂L
∂τF
− 1
1− φF
∂φF2
∂τF
}
αb
[
ρ
(
1− φI)
1 + ρN
]
+ λτF
[
rd
(
1− φF ) pK
q
](
1
L
∂L
∂τI
)
(2.46)
= λτI
[(
1− φI) ρb
q
](
1
τI
+
1
b
∂b
∂τI
− 1
1− φI
∂φI
∂τI
)
τF
(
1− φF ) rdpK + τIρ (1− φI) b = qR. (2.47)
Despite the simplifications generated by the small open economy assumptions,
these conditions remain quite complex. Nevertheless, two clear lessons emerge from
this formulation. First, assuming prices rise according to the zero-arbitrage condition
(q = 1 + ρ), if the government does not have to raise revenue from capital income
taxation (R = 0) both taxes are optimally zero. That is, at the optimum, neither tax
should be used to subsidize the other.8 The fact that this observation rests on the
assumption of zero arbitrage is a consequence of combining overlapping generations
with a perfectly substitutable foreign good. For example, suppose that the rate of
price increases falls below the interest rate, q < 1+ρ. In this case the individual views
future wages as relatively low, wDt+1 < wt, even in the absence of a residence-based
8This result rests on the exclusion of two potential considerations: immobile, location-specific
capital and residual taxation of foreign countries. Each of these factors may motivate a positive
source-based tax rate, as emphasized by Mintz (1995) and demonstrated in McKeehan and Zodrow
(2017).
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capital income tax. Consequently, any future wage distortions generated by τF are
also discounted, so that the individual’s welfare is maximized by some source-based
taxation as an instrument to finance a negative residence-based tax. Second, the opti-
mality conditions (2.45)-(2.47) suggest that neither tax is generally preferred in small
open economy. Under most economic conditions and a positive revenue requirement,
the small open economy will optimally use both source-based and residence-based
taxation to finance government expenditures.
Welfare and Revenue Effects of the Source-Based Tax
Since the complexity of (2.45)-(2.47) prevents easily expressing either tax as purely
a function of model parameters, I also derive the marginal welfare and revenue effects
associated with each tax, holding the opposing tax constant. First, using the indi-
vidual’s indirect utility function, the welfare effect of the source-based capital income
tax is
1
α
∂V
∂τF
= − (wh1 + wDh2) θK
θL
[
rd
(
1− φF )
rG
]
. (2.48)
This shows that the direct welfare effect of the source-based capital income tax in a
small open economy is driven by changes in the wage rate. The welfare effect of this
tax is necessarily negative, and increasing in magnitude with respect to cost share
of capital in production. Additionally, as firm-level income sheltering (φF ) increases,
both the wage distortion generated by the source-based tax and the direct welfare
effect of the tax become smaller.
Second, differentiating the government’s budget constraint with respect to the
source-based tax gives
∂R
∂τF
= τI
(
1− φI) ρb
q
(
1
b
∂b
∂τF
)
+ τF
[
rd
(
1− φF )K
q
](
1
L
∂L
∂τF
)
(2.49)
+ τF
[
rd
(
1− φF )K
q
]{
1
τF
− 1
1− φF
∂φF2
∂τF
− σ
θL
[
rd
(
1− φF )
rG
]}
.
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This highlights the primary revenue effects of the source-based capital tax. There are
three ways the source-based tax may lead to deterioration of the capital tax base:
(1) reducing domestic capital investment, (2) increasing firm-level income sheltering,
and (3) reducing savings.
A comparison of (2.48) and (2.49) demonstrates the complex interaction between
firm-level income sheltering and the source-based tax. On the one hand, increases
in the elasticity of firm-level income sheltering, which only affect (2.49), lower the
revenue gain from increasing the source-based tax. This implies that an increase in
the elasticity of firm income sheltering activity unambiguously raises the efficiency
cost of source-based capital income taxation. On the other hand, an increase in
the level of firm income sheltering (φF ) reduces the tax wedge generated by source-
based taxation and the associated wage distortion. Further, an increase in φF reduces
the size of the capital tax base, putting upward pressure on both the source-based
and residence-based capital income tax. On the whole, it is not obvious whether
firm income sheltering increases or decreases reliance on the source-based tax at the
optimum.
Welfare and Revenue Effects of the Residence-Based Tax
The direct welfare effect of the residence-based tax is
1
α
∂V
∂τI
=
(
wDh2 − pDc2) [ρ (1− φI)
1 + ρN
]
. (2.50)
Note that the savings rate can alternatively be written as b = pdc2−wDh2. Applying
this definition, it is clear there is no first-order welfare effect from the residence-based
tax if the individual neither saves nor borrows. Further, if b 6= 0 and there is a first-
order welfare effect, the magnitude of this effect is limited by the individual’s income
sheltering; income sheltering again reduces the effective tax wedge.
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The revenue effect of the residence-based tax is
∂R
∂τI
= τF
[
rd
(
1− φF )K
q
](
1
L
∂L
∂τI
)
(2.51)
+ τI
[
ρ
(
1− φI) b
q
](
1
τI
− 1
1− φI
∂φI
∂τI
+
1
b
∂b
∂τI
)
.
The first term in (2.51) captures the revenue effects of any production distortion
generated by the residence-based tax. As implied by (2.41), if the tax leads to an
increase in labor supply (∂L/∂τI > 0), domestic capital investment (and production)
increase proportionately — the capital tax base expands. Conversely, if the residence-
based capital income tax leads to a reduction in the domestic labor supply, this causes
a corresponding decrease in domestic capital investment and production.
The second term in (2.51) captures the effects on the base for τI . As in (2.49),
increases in the corresponding sheltering elasticity imply increases in the residence-
based tax generate smaller revenue gains. The second part of (2.51) also includes the
savings effect, 1
b
∂b
∂τI
, which incorporates two important prior observations about the
efficiency of residence-based capital income taxation.
First, using the individual’s consumption and leisure responses to taxation (pre-
sented in Appendix A.1.1), it is easy to show that the savings effect becomes more
negative as consumption becomes increasingly substitutable across periods (this is
derived in Appendix A.1.2). That is, as the inter-temporal consumption elasticity
increases, increases in the residence-based tax rate generate less revenue. This obser-
vation reflects the insight included in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and emphasized
by Feldstein (1978): Residence-based capital income taxation distorts the timing of
consumption, so that as the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
increases, so does the distortionary cost of residence-based taxation.
Second, as demonstrated in Appendix A.1.3, the savings effect becomes more
positive as the complementarity of consumption and leisure increases in the second
period. This reflects the observation of Erosa and Gervais (2002): As the relative
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complementarity of consumption and leisure rises later in the life-cycle, the efficiency
cost of residence-based capital income taxation falls. Since a residence-based capital
income tax raises the cost of consumption in later periods, if consumption and leisure
are complements in the second period the residence-based capital income tax can
actually encourage labor force-participation and counteract the labor-discouraging
effects of the source-based tax rate.
2.4 Capital Income Taxation in a Partially Open Economy
The partially open economy primarily differs from the small open economy de-
scribed above by allowing for immobile capital. Under imperfect capital mobility,
it is possible that the domestic rate of return on investment differs from the return
earned in international markets. Further, in a partially open economy domestic cap-
ital investment may vary according to changes in domestic saving. To incorporate
both of these considerations, I expand the resident individual’s problem so that the
individual not only chooses how much to save, but also where to invest any savings.
This investment decision is driven not only by the rates of return available, but also
by an exogenous cost of investing abroad. Consequently, the individual may choose
to make some domestic investments even if the domestic rate of return falls below the
international rate. These modeling expansions are characterized below.
For a given level of savings bt, the individual chooses how much to invest do-
mestically (bdt ) and how much to invest abroad (bt − bdt ). Letting φBt = bdt /bt in-
dicate the share of savings invested domestically, the cost of foreign investment is
zB
(
1− φBt
)
ρt+1bt. By assumption, z
B(0) = 0 and zB is a convex, increasing function
of 1− φBt . Accounting for this cost, the individual allocates investment domestically
and internationally to maximize the after-cost, pre-tax rate of return
ρt+1 = φ
B
t r
d
t+1 +
(
1− φBt
)
rt+1 − zB
(
1− φBt
)
. (2.52)
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This implies the individual will choose to shift income such that zB
′
= rt+1 − rdt+1.9
This pre-tax rate of return, which now may vary with government policy, corresponds
to that referenced in (2.2), so the individual’s problem is otherwise unchanged from
the problem presented in Section 2.1.1.
In addition to the modifications to the individual’s problem defined above, the
capital market clearing conditions in the partially open economy differ considerably
from those in the small open economy. Primarily, the level of domestic capital invest-
ment may vary with domestic savings. To capture this consideration, I assume that
the domestic individual is the marginal investor in the domestic economy,
∂Kt
∂τF
=
1
pt−1
∂bdt−1
∂τF
∂Kt
∂τI
=
1
pt−1
∂bdt−1
∂τI
. (2.53)
Under this assumption, capital and domestic saving are related by
1
Kt
∂Kt
∂τ
=
bdt−1
pt−1Kt
[
rdt
zB ′′φBt−1
(
1
rdt
∂rdt
∂τ
)
+
1
bt−1
∂bt−1
∂τ
]
, τ = τI , τF . (2.54)
The savings-investment relationship defined in (2.54) combined with the capital-labor
relationship (2.35) implicitly determines how the domestic cost of capital responds
to each tax rate in equilibrium. While the associated derivations are algebraically
complex (and thus are included in Appendix A.1.4), the steady state responses are
related through
1
rd
∂rd
∂τF
=
[
rd
(
1− φF )
rG
ρN
ρ (1− φI)
](
1
rd
∂rd
∂τI
)
QA −
rd
(
1− φF )
rG
, (2.55)
where QA → 1 in a completely closed economy.
Since it is possible that the domestic cost of capital (rdt ) will respond to changes
9I further assume that zB
′
(1) ≥ rt+1 − rdt+1 and rt+1 ≥ rdt+1 so that 0 ≤ φBt ≤ 1.
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in domestic tax policy, the gross cost of capital responses are
1
rGt
∂rGt
∂τF
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1
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∂rdt
∂τF
+
rdt
(
1− φFt
)
rGt
(2.56)
and
1
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∂rGt
∂τI
=
1
rdt
∂rdt
∂τI
. (2.57)
As (2.57) suggests, the domestic wage rate may be affected by the residence-based
tax in the partially open economy.
Equations (2.56) and (2.57) additionally imply that the individual’s pre-tax rate
of return to saving may be affected by either tax, since this return is a function of
the domestic cost of capital. As long as the domestic investor chooses the share of
savings invested domestically to maximize the pre-tax rate of return (2.52), the gross
rate of return to saving responds to domestic taxes according to
1
ρt
∂ρt
∂τ
=
rdt b
d
t−1
ρtbt−1
(
1
rdt
∂rdt
∂τ
)
, τ = τI , τF . (2.58)
Accounting for the gross-return responses given in (2.58), the net return to saving
responds to the source-based and residence-based tax rates such that
1
1 + ρNt+1
∂ρNt+1
∂τF
=
ρNt+1
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(
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and
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, (2.60)
respectively.
Generally, the price responses in (2.56)-(2.60) suggest the difference between
source-based and residence-based taxation is considerably more nuanced in a par-
tially open economy. Both taxes have the ability to adjust all endogenous prices, and
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thus may affect the behavior of both firms and individuals, regardless of who pays
the tax.
2.4.1 Optimal Taxation in a Partially Open Economy
Using the price responses derived above, the steady-state optimality conditions in
the partially open economy become
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Unlike in the small open economy, the optimality conditions (2.61)-(2.63) suggest
some non-zero capital income taxation can be optimal in the absence of a revenue
requirement, even when prices increase according to a zero-arbitrage condition. To
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illustrate this, at τI = τF = R = 0 and qt = 1 + ρt, these conditions simplify to(
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)]
= 0. (2.64)
That is, the welfare-maximizing government will only abstain from either form of cap-
ital income taxation in the absence of a revenue requirement if all domestic capital
investment is made by local investors
(
bd/q = K
)
. This condition results from as-
sumption (2.53), that domestic investment is determined by the domestic investor at
the margin. As long as there is inelastic investment from foreign agents, source-based
capital income taxation offers an opportunity for capital tax burden exporting.
Welfare and Revenue Effects of the Source-Based Tax
The optimality conditions (2.61)-(2.63) are again complex enough to prevent pre-
senting either tax as purely a function of model parameters, so I again derive the
marginal revenue and welfare effects associated with each tax, holding the opposing
tax constant. In the partially open economy, the direct welfare effect of the source-
based tax is
1
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.
This highlights how the source-based tax not only distorts the individual’s wage, but
also the domestic cost of capital in a partially open economy. Depending on whether
the source-based tax decreases or increases the domestic return to capital, this may act
to attenuate or compound the wage distortion. This also suggests that source-based
taxation may affect individuals who borrow or save, and this effect which cannot be
mitigated through income sheltering activity. However, as the residence-based tax
decreases the net return to saving (ρNt ), the welfare consequences of this distortion
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diminish.
The direct revenue effect of the source-based tax in the partially open economy is
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.
Comparison to (2.49) reveals how the impact of the source-based tax changes in a
partially open economy: the equations are identical except that in a partially open
economy the source-based tax may affect the domestic return to capital. Any decrease
(increase) in the domestic return decreases (increases) both tax bases and increases
(decreases) the efficiency cost associated with source-based taxation. However, in
combination with the direct welfare effects (2.65), it is not clear that the efficiency
cost of the source-based tax rises in the partially open economy even when the sign
of ∂rd/∂τF is known. Any decrease in the domestic rate of return, corresponding to
an increase in capital investment, puts upward pressure on the individual’s wage rate
— the revenue and welfare effects work in opposition.
Welfare and Revenue Effects of the Residence-Based Tax
The direct welfare effect of the residence-based tax in the partially open economy
is
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.
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This expression is remarkably similar to (2.65), only replacing the direct effect of the
source-based tax on the wage rate with the direct effect of the residence-based tax on
the return to saving. Further, as the economy becomes increasingly closed, the direct
welfare effects presented in (2.65) and (2.67) become increasingly similar. In fact, in
a completely closed economy with no income sheltering the two welfare effects are
identical after scaling for gross tax rates.10
In the partially open economy, the direct revenue effect of the residence-based tax
is
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.
As demonstrated in the Appendix A.1.2, this formulation suggests the importance of
the inter-temporal consumption elasticity emphasized by Feldstein (1978), which was
noted in the small open economy, persists even in a partially open economy. However,
it is complicated because the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
also interacts with the rate-of-return response
(
1
rdt
∂rdt
∂τI
)
, which is itself affected by
the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.11 Similarly, the effect
aligning with Erosa and Gervais’ (2002) insight that an increase in second-period
consumption-labor complementarity supports residence-based taxation persists in the
partially open economy. However, the effect is again complicated by interactions
with changes in the rate of return to capital. As with the direct welfare effect, in
the extreme case of a completely closed economy the direct revenue effect of the
10To show this, apply the relationship (2.55) to (2.67). Under the assumptions of a closed economy
with no income sheltering this gives 1α
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=
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11This relationship can again be shown by first applying (2.55) to the labor and savings responses
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(assuming a completely closed economy with no sheltered
income).
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residence-based tax and the source-based tax are equivalent after scaling for gross
tax rates. Consequently, while an increasing inter-temporal elasticity of substitution
or a decreasing second-period consumption-leisure complementarity favors source-
based taxation in the small open economy, the importance of these considerations is
diminished in a partially open economy. Instead, considerations such as asymmetric
income sheltering opportunities become increasingly important.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper uses an analytical equilibrium model to study the impact of global-
ization on the optimal choice between source-based and residence-based capital in-
come taxation. In this model globalization is represented through two changes in the
economy: increasingly mobile capital investment and increased opportunities for in-
ternational income sheltering. The interactions of these two considerations are shown
to be complex. In a relatively closed economy with immobile capital investments,
source-based and residence-based taxes have similar effects, suggesting that asymme-
try in income sheltering opportunities is likely to drive the choice between the two
forms of capital income taxation. However, as capital becomes more mobile, the cap-
ital distortions generated by these two taxes become more distinct. Consequently,
holding income sheltering opportunities constant, the role of income sheltering in de-
termining the optimal form of capital income taxation is expected to diminish as an
economy becomes increasingly global. This is compounded by the observation that,
even when income sheltering opportunities are increasing, it is not clear that these
increases will affect the relative optimality of these two tax systems since sheltering
activity has conflicting efficiency implications. On the one hand, income sheltering is
a costly, non-productive activity that only arises in response to taxation, decreasing
the efficiency of the associated tax. On the other hand, income sheltering also reduces
the real economic distortions generated by taxation. In sum, these factors suggest
that when choosing between source-based and residence-based taxation in increas-
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ingly global markets, policy makers should focus on mitigating capital distortions,
not income sheltering.
Focusing on capital distortions, the classic efficiency considerations associated
with each form of taxation drive the choice between source-based and residence-based
taxation in a partially (or fully) open economy. When the production cost share of
capital or the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is high, source-
based taxation becomes less desirable. When the domestic inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution is high or the complementarity of consumption and leisure is falling
with age, residence-based taxation becomes less desirable. On the whole, whether
globalization favors source-based or residence-based capital income taxation depends
more on the preferences of domestic residents and opportunities for attracting foreign
investment than on income sheltering behavior.
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Chapter 3
Balancing Act: Weighing the Factors Affecting the
Taxation of Capital Income in a Small Open
Economy
Written in collaboration with George R. Zodrow.
Published in International Tax and Public Finance, Volume 24, Issue 1, pp. 1–35.
3.1 Introduction
Under the appropriate assumptions, optimal tax theory provides a striking re-
sult on the use of source-based taxes on capital income such as the typical corporate
income tax: in a small open economy that cannot affect the after-tax return to inter-
nationally mobile capital or the prices of tradable goods, the optimal capital income
tax rate is zero (Gordon 1986; Razin and Sadka 1991; Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1983).1
This result does not rely on — although it is reinforced by — concerns about the neg-
ative effects of capital income taxation on domestic saving or the distortions of many
types of investment decisions under the typical corporate income tax (Nicodme 2008),
or the tendency toward under-provision of public services financed with capital in-
come taxes in the presence of international tax competition (Zodrow and Mieszkowski
1986; Wilson 1986). Instead, the argument follows from the assumption that the small
open economy faces a perfectly elastic supply of highly mobile international capital.
In this case, the imposition of a source-based tax on capital income will simply cause
internationally mobile capital to migrate to other countries until its after-tax return
in the taxing country increases to the internationally determined rate of return. This
1For further discussion, see Zodrow (2010a, b).
39
emigration of capital lowers the productivity of the fixed factors in the taxing country
— land, labor (or at least relatively immobile labor), and any immobile capital —
so that local factors of production ultimately bear the entire burden of the capital
income tax, including both the revenue raised and the efficiency costs of the tax due
to capital emigration (as well as the other distortionary costs noted above). Indeed,
Harberger (1995, 2008) argues that immobile labor and land may bear more than one
hundred percent of a corporate income tax in a small open economy, once general
equilibrium effects across business sectors are considered.
This argument is reinforced by two additional considerations in the modern global
economy. The first is a straightforward extension of the basic argument, applied to
investments by multinational corporations (MNCs) that generate significant firm-
specific economic rents; such rents are attributable to factors unique to the firm
such as specialized and patented technological knowledge, superior managerial skills
or production techniques, or valuable product brands, trademarks, reputations, and
other intangible assets (Dunning 1981). Moreover, there is some empirical evidence
that the relative importance of such rents is increasing over time, as Auerbach (2006)
shows that the dispersion of relative profitability for US corporations has increased
significantly in recent years, suggesting an increase in the importance of investments
that generate above-normal returns made by a relatively small number of highly
profitable firms. Because such firm-specific capital is likely to be especially mobile
and also may have the potential for significant increases in the productivity of local
factors (e.g., it is most likely to be associated with high levels of technology transfer,
access to skilled labor including highly effective management, and the generation
of other external benefits including the creation of a competitive environment that
fosters invention and innovation), concerns about tax-induced emigration of mobile
capital may be especially pronounced for such investments, reinforcing the standard
zero-tax argument (Gordon and Hines 2002).
The second issue has been the focus of many recent policy discussions, most re-
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cently in the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2013). Specifically, the application
of a relatively high corporate tax rate to the income of MNCs encourages them to
engage in profit shifting, that is, to use various financial manipulations, including
transfer pricing, the relocation of the ownership of intangibles, and the use of loan
reallocations that facilitate interest stripping, to shift revenues to relatively low tax
countries and deductions to relatively high-tax countries. There is considerable em-
pirical evidence of income shifting (Clausing 2011, 2016; Dowd 2016), in particular
that a relatively high statutory corporate tax rate encourages income shifting, since
it is the statutory tax rate that determines the value to the firm of shifted revenues
and deductions. Thus a desire to avoid creating incentives for income shifting also
puts downward pressure on capital income tax rates.2
Despite these arguments, as well as empirical evidence of the importance of in-
ternational tax competition (Devereux and Loretz 2013), corporate income tax rates
in small open economies have not in practice converged to zero (although they have
declined on average over time). A wide variety of arguments have been offered in
support of corporate taxation, all of which qualify the argument that a small open
economy should exempt capital income from tax. Although it is difficult to judge
the relative importance of each of these qualifications, the pervasiveness of corporate
income taxation around the world suggests that together these arguments have been
taken seriously by policymakers.
Perhaps the most important argument in support of a relatively high level of
source-based capital income taxation is that it allows the government to obtain sig-
nificant revenues from the taxation of location-specific economic rents. Such rents,
which may accrue to both domestically-owned firms and firms that are partially or
fully owned by foreigners, can reflect resource rents as well as economic rents that
2Furthermore, a low statutory rate may make a country attractive for investment by MNCs
simply because it creates the potential for additional income shifting (Slemrod 1997).
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arise because of factors such as local economies of agglomeration, productive govern-
ment infrastructure, easier access to consumer markets (including those for financial
services), lower transport costs, and inexpensive but relatively productive local fac-
tors of production including skilled labor — in addition to the ability to avoid trade
barriers such as tariffs and quotas.
The taxation of location-specific economic rents provides an efficient and thus
highly desirable source of revenue. Moreover, if these rents accrue to foreigners, such
taxes are especially attractive from the perspective of the taxing country, as the
burden of the tax on rents is borne by foreigners, while marginal domestic investment
decisions are not distorted (Mintz 1995). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that
a higher share of foreign ownership in a country tends to result in a higher average
corporate income tax rate (Huizinga and Nicodme 2006).
A second argument is related to the prevalence of income shifting noted above.
Specifically, although a high domestic corporate tax rate tends to encourage more
income shifting, the existence of income shifting to some extent mitigates the negative
effect of a high statutory tax rate on foreign direct investment by MNCs, since firms
know they will be able to avoid some of the costs of a high tax rate in a host country by
shifting income to lower tax countries. Indeed, to the extent that such tax avoidance
opportunities are available primarily to MNCs and such firms are more mobile than
domestic companies, a relatively high statutory rate may be desirable as part of a
strategy that attracts FDI at minimal revenue cost by imposing a high tax burden
on relatively immobile domestic capital but a low effective tax burden, taking into
account tax avoidance activities, on relatively mobile international capital (Hong and
Smart 2010; Gugl and Zodrow 2006). An aggressive version of this strategy would
include lax enforcement of the many rules currently used to limit tax avoidance by
MNCs or even explicit regulations that facilitate such tax avoidance — the new
variation of international tax competition stressed by Altshuler and Grubert (2006),
which they note is exemplified by the long-time existence of the “check-the-box” rules
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in the United States.
A third argument for a relatively high corporate tax rate in a small open econ-
omy was once believed to be compelling, but has been declining in importance over
time. Specifically, the “treasury transfer” argument suggests that a host country that
imports capital primarily from countries that use residence-based corporate income
tax systems and grant foreign tax credits (FTCs) should raise its tax rate approxi-
mately to the rate utilized by those countries, since such a rate increase will essentially
transfer revenues from the treasury of the home countries to the treasury of the host
country without having any deleterious effects on FDI (since the combined host and
home countries tax burden borne by the MNC is always determined solely by the
statutory tax rate of the home country).
The prospect of such a “free” source of tax revenue is naturally appealing and
has been stressed in many tax policy discussions. However, there are at least three
reasons the treasury transfer effect is often argued to be of limited relevance in the
modern economy. First, because both Japan and the United Kingdom have recently
switched to “territorial” tax systems under which foreign-source income is largely tax
exempt, the United States is now the only major industrialized country that utilizes
a residence-based tax system with an FTC. Thus, the treasury transfer argument
is potentially relevant only for countries that import significant amounts of capital
from the United States.3 Second, because of various limitations placed on the use
of foreign tax credits, many US multinationals are in an “excess foreign tax credit”
position — that is, they already have more credits than they can use currently, so
that additional credits are of limited value and a lower host country tax rate should
attract additional FDI. Third, the importance of the treasury transfer effect is limited
by the fact that host country taxes are assessed currently but foreign tax credits in
3Although the relative importance of FDI from the United States has of course declined in recent
years, it is still significant in many countries. For example, the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (2012) reports that the U.S. accounts for roughly a quarter of foreign
direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean.
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the home country are not granted until the funds are repatriated to the parent firm.
Indeed, under certain circumstances, a home country repatriation tax has no effect on
investment financed with the retained earnings of the subsidiary (Hartman 1985; Sinn
1987) — although the relevance in practice of this proposition has been the subject
of debate; in particular, Grubert and Altshuler (2013, Appendix A) argue that the
Hartman-Sinn model is based on very restrictive assumptions and its predictions are
inconsistent with the empirical data on repatriations.
It is also interesting to note, however, that the importance of the treasury transfer
effect may be increasing — currently and perhaps to a significantly greater extent in
the near future — for host countries with relatively low tax rates. Specifically, many
capital-exporting countries have become increasingly concerned about revenue losses
due to income shifting by multinationals, especially to very low rate tax haven coun-
tries, and are enacting, or considering the enactment of, what are broadly referred
to as “anti-base-erosion” provisions (OECD 2013). Although such provisions may
take many forms, one common approach is to impose current home country taxes on
income that is earned in relatively low-rate jurisdictions. For example, the new ter-
ritorial tax system in Japan includes Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) provisions
under which Japanese companies are required to report as domestic income taxable
profits earned in any country with an effective tax rate of 20 percent or less (Deloitte
2014).
Similar provisions have been proposed in the context of reform of the system
of international taxation in the United States. For example, the discussion draft
put forward by Representative Dave Camp includes an anti-base-erosion provision
under which foreign-source income from intangibles derived from sales to foreign
markets would be taxed in the United States in the year earned at a 15 percent rate,
subject to credits for foreign taxes paid, while foreign-source income from intangibles
derived from sales to the US market would be taxed in the year earned at a 25
percent rate all relative to a proposed general corporate statutory tax rate of 25
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percent.4 The discussion draft released by Senator Max Baucus would tax all passive
and highly mobile foreign-source income, as well as foreign-source income earned
from selling goods and services back to the U.S., in the year earned at the statutory
corporate tax rate, subject to credits for foreign taxes paid. Foreign-source income
from products and services sold abroad would similarly be taxed currently, although
at reduced rates.5 Both of these proposals could significantly increase the relevance
of the treasury transfer effect, although within the context of a lower US corporate
tax rate.
Numerous other arguments support some source-based capital income taxation,
often in the form of a corporate income tax. From a domestic perspective, a corporate
income tax is often deemed to be desirable as a “backstop” to the personal income
tax; that is, depending on relative personal and corporate tax rates, a corporate
income tax may be desirable to prevent individuals from incorporating and deferring
personal income tax on labor income by retaining the earnings in corporate form while
financing any desired consumption with loans from their companies. In addition, the
small open economy assumptions may be too extreme for some countries; Gravelle
and Smetters (2006) stress that the economic effects of corporate income taxes differ
significantly if capital is imperfectly mobile or if traded and domestically-produced
goods are imperfect substitutes. Finally, a corporate income tax may be politically
indispensable in many countries.
Relatively few papers have examined the interactions of these competing effects
on capital income taxation from the perspective of an open economy. Four papers
are particularly relevant to our analysis.
Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1995) consider the interaction of domestic income
shifting and international income shifting. In their model, an optimal tax system
4Details of the Camp discussion draft are available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/
UploadedFiles/Statutory_Text_Tax_Reform_Act_of_2014_Discussion_Draft__022614.pdf.
5Details of the Baucus discussion draft are available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/Chairman’sStaffInternationalDiscussionDraftSummary.pdf.
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balances the cost from individuals disguising labor income as capital income when
the capital income tax rate is lowered against the benefit of an increase in the tax
base due to reduced international income shifting.6
Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) examine optimal rules for separate taxes on all capital
income and on above-normal profits in a small open economy model where foreigners
own some of the domestic capital stock. They show that, as long as above-normal
profits are taxed at rates less than one hundred percent, some source-based taxation
of capital income is desirable to extract rents from foreign owners of domestic capital.
Becker and Fuest (2011) examine how differences in capital mobility and prof-
itability affect the desirability of base broadening, rate reducing (BBRR) corporate
reforms relative to introducing investment incentives. Specifically, they show that
under certain circumstances a BBRR reform that involves a corporate rate reduc-
tion financed by less generous deductions for depreciation is preferable to increasing
investment incentives if relatively more mobile firms are also more profitable than
their relatively immobile competitors. The intuition is that a lower statutory rate is
desirable to attract/retain the more mobile firms which are highly responsive to the
statutory rate since that is the rate applied to its above-normal profits, even at the
cost of reducing investment incentives (accelerated depreciation), which are relatively
more important in determining the tax burden of the comparatively immobile less
profitable firms.
Finally, Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) construct a model that includes foreign
direct investment and the possibility of income shifting. Like Becker and Fuest (2011),
they show that under certain circumstances a BBRR reform that involves a corporate
rate reduction financed by less generous deductions for depreciation is desirable, as
the gains from reducing income shifting are unambiguously larger than the costs of
6See also Gordon and Slemrod (2000), who estimate the extent of income shifting between the
personal and corporate income tax bases following the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and
Slemrod and Wilson (2009) who investigate the effects of such shifting in the presence of low-rate
tax havens.
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reducing investment incentives.
In a similar vein, we construct a simple theoretical model that illustrates how the
government of a small open economy might balance some of the trade-offs involved in
taxing capital income described above, and then simulate a more complicated version
of the model to see how much optimal capital income tax rates might vary from zero
under scenarios that take into account the interactions between the various factors
analyzed.7 We maintain the standard small open economy assumptions of perfect
mobility (of certain forms of) capital and perfect substitutability of domestic and
foreign tradable goods in our model. In addition, we assume the economy is small
enough that changes in domestic tax policy do not affect the determination of tax
rates in other countries; that is, foreign countries do not respond strategically to the
increase in the domestic tax rate, as foreign tax rates are treated as exogenous. In our
base analytical model, we focus on the trade-offs involved in balancing (1) the costs
of taxing highly mobile capital, including firm-specific capital earning above-normal
returns, and (2) the costs of encouraging income shifting to lower-tax jurisdictions,
against (3) the gains from taxing location-specific capital, some of which is foreign-
owned, (4) the mitigating effects on tax-induced reductions of FDI of the presence
income shifting possibilities, and (5) the potential for a treasury transfer effect. Our
base model does not include explicit costs of income shifting or the potential for
disguising labor income as capital income. However, we include these features in our
computational model, which also includes ordinary capital in both production sectors,
7To simplify the analysis, we model a single “capital income tax rate” (τ), which serves as a
proxy for a combination of the various relevant tax rates. For example, the relevant capital income
tax rate would be the statutory rate for equity-financed domestic investment under a system that
measured real economic income accurately (e.g., with tax depreciation equal to inflation-adjusted
economic depreciation and no other investment allowances). In practice, tax systems are far more
complicated, with lower effective tax rates due to interest deductions for debt-financed investment
and accelerated depreciation deductions, investment tax credits, etc. In addition, different tax rates
are relevant at different margins — the statutory rate is most relevant for income shifting, some
combination of the statutory rate and the effective tax rate is most relevant for investment of firm-
specific capital, and the effective tax rate is most relevant for investment of ordinary capital. Note,
however, that we do model explicitly the reduction in the effective capital income tax rate due to
income shifting.
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endogenous labor supply, a proportional labor income tax, and the possibility of direct
taxation of location-specific capital.
The base analytical model confirms several general results, showing that some
capital income taxation may be efficient in the presence of residual taxation or foreign
ownership of location-specific capital. The computational model confirms and extends
these observations, showing that foreign ownership and residual taxation can both
generate large increases in the optimal capital income tax rate. However, these results
are subject to various qualifications. If separate taxation of location-specific capital
is feasible, foreign ownership does not notably increase the optimal general capital
income tax rate. While residual taxation is shown to be an important consideration,
changes in the foreign tax rate have minimal effects on the optimal domestic rate
unless the two rates are very close to each other. The computational model also
highlights the varying importance of income shifting activity. If individuals are able
to easily disguise labor income as capital income, increasing capital income taxation
becomes more desirable. However, greater international income shifting opportunities
have only modest effects on the optimal capital income tax rate due to offsetting
effects. While increases in income shifting imply the size of the tax base is more
sensitive to capital income taxation, income shifting opportunities also lower the
tax sensitivity of real investment (since firms know they will be able to lower their
effective tax burden through income shifting) and increase the proportion of relatively
immobile factors in the tax base.
We describe the structure of our base analytical model in the following section,
and the characteristics of the solution for the optimal capital income tax rate in
Section 3. The details of the expanded computational model are presented in Section
4, which also provides the results of simulating that model for the optimal capital
income tax rate for a wide variety of parameter values. Conclusions and directions
for future research are discussed in the final section.
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3.2 The Base Model
Our base analytical model is designed to capture four of the primary factors
that influence the optimal capital income tax rate in a small open economy: (1)
immobile capital that earns location-specific rents, some of which may be owned by
foreigners; (2) perfectly mobile foreign-owned capital that earns firm-specific rents;
(3) the possibility of capital income shifting; and (4) the possibility of residual home
country taxation of foreign-source income by countries that operate a residence-based
system of taxation, such as the United States, or countries like Japan that have base
erosion provisions that apply domestic tax on an accrual basis to income earned in
host countries with sufficiently low tax rates, subject to foreign tax credits.
To capture these effects we construct a simple two-sector model. Sector one is
a “domestic” sector that produces a non-traded good (X1) using labor (L1) and
location-specific capital (LSK) that is fixed, immobile, and earns economic rents
(ρLSK) that may be partially or completely foreign-owned. Sector two is a “multi-
national” sector that produces a traded good (X2) using labor (L2) and firm-specific
capital (FSK) that is perfectly mobile, foreign-owned, and earns economic rents at
an internationally determined rate of return (ρF ). The price of the traded good (p2) is
also determined internationally, and it is possible that the small open economy may be
either a net importer or a net exporter. The domestic good is produced using a con-
stant returns to scale technology, X1 = F1(L1;LSK). The earnings of capital in the
domestic sector are subject to capital income taxation at a statutory tax rate τ , so the
profit-maximizing labor demand in sector one is the solution to max
L1
{p1X1 − wL1},
where p1 is the market price of good one and w is the market wage. In equilibrium,
the before-tax economic rents earned by LSK are (1 + τ) ρLLSK = p1X1 − wL1.
Note that in order to simplify the model, we treat the corporate tax simply as ap-
plying to all capital income, and thus do not consider many complicating and distor-
tionary features of actual corporate income taxes, including deductions for economic
depreciation, accelerated depreciation deductions, investment tax credits and other
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investment preferences, the treatment of inflation, as well as differential treatment of
equity and debt finance, especially deductions for interest expense.
Production in the multinational or traded goods sector is a function of the amounts
of labor (L2) and FSK utilized, X2 = F2 (L2, FSK).
8 The earnings of the firm-
specific capital in the multinational sector are in principle also subject to the statutory
capital income tax rate. However, a fraction (φS) of capital income in this multina-
tional sector is shifted to a tax haven country with a relatively low tax rate τH ; the
fraction shifted is a function of the tax differential τ − τH . Only the unshifted share
of capital income (1−φS) is subject to the domestic tax. In addition, a fraction φF of
the unshifted income is also subject to a current residual tax imposed by the foreign
(home) country at tax rate τF . We assume that none of the capital income shifted to
the tax haven is subject to a residual tax.
Consequently, the effective capital income tax rate in the multinational sector,
taking into account income shifting to tax havens and residual home country current
taxation, is TK = (1− φS) [τ + φF max(τF − τ, 0)] + φSτH . Given any level of FSK,
the multinational firms in sector two choose labor to maximize profit. The amount of
firm-specific capital invested is the amount consistent with after-tax earnings equal
to the internationally-determined rate of return ρF , taking into account the demand
for labor as a function of FSK. That is, the amount of firm-specific capital invested
in the country is such that ρF = (p2X2 − wL2)/[(1 + TK)FSK] , where both X2 and
L2 are functions of the firm-specific capital invested.
In the base model, we assume a single representative resident with inelastic labor
8Following the approach used in the CORTAX computable general equilbrium model constructed
by Bettendorf et al. (2009) and de Mooij and Devereux (2011), we model the factor generating firm-
specific rents as an explicit production input characterized by “fixed management capacity.” That
is, we assume a fixed amount of firm-specific capital (which includes a combination of factors such
as unique managerial skills, production processes, and intangible capital) that must be allocated
among different locations around the world. A similar approach is used by Becker and Fuest (2011),
who consider “ownership skill” that creates above-normal returns, assuming first that the amount
of this skill is fixed and must be allocated across countries, and then extending the analysis to the
case in which ownership skill is unlimited. Devereux, Fuest, and Lockwood (2014) consider both
cases as well as intermediate possibilities.
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supply. Consequently, the individual allocates income across consumption goods to
maximize utility, producing the indirect utility function
v (p1, I) = max
C1, C2
{U (C1, C2) | I ≥ p1C1 + p2C2} , (3.1)
where Ci is the consumption of good i, pi is the market price of good i, and I is the
individual’s after-tax income. We hold government services (G) constant throughout
the analysis and assume they are separable from consumption in the individual’s
welfare function. Income is composed of labor income and capital income, less any
lump-sum taxes levied by the government, so that net income is
I = wL+ θρLLSK − t (3.2)
where t is the lump-sum tax, L is the fixed level of total labor supply, and θ is the
share of location-specific capital that is owned domestically.
Government services are modeled as purchases of the tradable good, and govern-
ment revenues are raised from capital income taxation of the returns to LSK and
FSK and the lump-sum tax (which is a proxy for labor income taxation in the base
model, given the assumption of an inelastic supply of labor). The government budget
constraint is thus
p2G ≤ τρLLSK + (1− φS) τρFFSK + t. (3.3)
Finally, since total labor supply (L) is fixed, equilibrium in the labor market
requires L1 +L2 = L, and equilibrium in the domestic good market requires C1 = X1.
Combining these two conditions with the first-order conditions for the consumer and
producer optimization problems fully specifies the equilibrium in the model.
51
3.3 Properties of the Optimal Capital Income Tax Rate
3.3.1 Characterizing the Optimal Capital Income Tax Rate
The government chooses its tax rates to maximize the utility of the representa-
tive resident while ensuring that revenues are sufficient to finance a fixed level of
the separable public good (G), which is modeled as purchases of the output of the
multinational sector. The government thus solves
max
τ,t
{v (p1, I) + λ [p2G− τρLLSK − τ (1− φS) ρFFSK − t]} ,
where v (p1, I) is the individual indirect utility function, the government budget con-
straint is p2G = τ [ρLLSK + (1− φS) ρFFSK] + t = R + t, and R is capital income
tax revenue. Since the lump-sum tax is always available to the government, the cap-
ital income tax will be used only if it can successfully extract resources from foreign
investors, that is, if some of the tax burden can successfully be “exported” abroad.
Note that the capital tax is applied to all unshifted capital income earned in the coun-
try. Substituting from the government budget constraint, the government’s problem
becomes
max
τ
v (p1, I) ;
I = (wL+ θρLLSK)− {p2G− τ [ρLLSK + (1− φS) ρFFSK]} . (3.4)
Thus, since income is defined to include the head tax, any revenue shortfalls that
arise due to outmigration of FSK or any declines in the return to LSK associated
with increases in the capital income tax rate must be offset with head tax increases.
The first-order condition for the optimal capital income tax rate is
∂v(p1, I)
∂τ
=
∂v
∂p1
∂p1
∂τ
+
∂v
∂I
∂I
∂τ
= −C1α∂p1
∂τ
+ α
∂I
∂τ
= α
[
1
I
∂I
∂τ
−
(
p1C1
I
)
1
p1
∂p1
∂τ
]
= 0
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1
α
∂v(p1, I)
∂τ
= piI − ψIC1pip1 = 0, (3.5)
using Roy’s Identity, and defining piI and pip1 as the tax semi-elasticities of the sub-
scripted variables, ψIC1 as the expenditure share of good one, and α as the marginal
utility of income. This condition reflects the standard result that the optimal capital
income tax rate should be set to maximize the dollar value of individual utility at the
margin, which requires that the change in real income, or the sum of the “sources”
and “uses” effects on utility, equals zero. This expression can be interpreted in terms
of several key tax semi-elasticities.
Tax Semi-elasticity of Income
The tax semi-elasticity of income is
piI = ψ
I
Lpiw +
[
ψILSK +
(
R
I
)
ψRLSK
]
piρL +
(
R
I
)
ψRFSK (piFSK + pi1−φS) +
(
R
I
)
1
τ
,
(3.6)
where the various ψ’s are factor shares in income or total capital income tax revenue
(R). The tax semi-elasticity of income is thus determined by the changes in the
returns to the two fixed factors in response to an increase in the capital income tax
and the change in the head tax, which equals the change in capital tax revenues,
taking into account the effects of the tax on FSK and ρL.
Tax Semi-elasticity of the Wage
To obtain the tax semi-elasticity of the wage, recall that in the multinational sector
the effective tax rate on FSK is TK = (1− φS) [τ + φFmax (τF − τ, 0)] + φSτH . We
assume that τF > τ for this derivation, so that
TK = (1− φS) (1− φF ) τ + (1− φS)φF τF + φSτH
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which implies that
∂TK
∂τ
= (1− φS) (1− φF ) + (1− φS) [(1− φF ) τ + φF τF − τH ] pi1−φS (3.7)
is a constant determined by the extent of income shifting and residual taxation.
With constant returns to scale in labor and FSK in the multinational sector, dif-
ferentiating the unit cost function with respect to τ for fixed ρF yields χL2piw +
χFSK2piρFG = 0, where the χ terms are gross factor shares in production costs and
piρFG = (∂TK/∂τ)/(1 + TK) is the tax semi-elasticity of the gross rate of return to
FSK. Thus, with a fixed commodity price and a fixed return to FSK in the multi-
national sector, any increase in the capital income tax burden is fully reflected in a
reduction in wages — consistent with the traditional small open economy reasoning
described above.
Tax Semi-elasticity of the Price of Good One
Similarly, with constant returns to scale in labor and LSK in the domestic sector,
pip1 = χL1piw + χLSK1piρLG = χL1piw + χLSK1
(
piρL +
1
1 + τ
)
. (3.8)
Thus, the tax semi-elasticity of the price of the domestic good is determined by a
weighted average of the tax semi-elasticities of the gross prices of the two inputs,
labor and location-specific capital.
Tax Semi-elasticity of the Return to Location-specific Capital
Differentiating the consumer’s first-order condition for the domestic good yields
piC1 =
(
ε11 − η1ψIC1
)
pip1 + η1piI , where ε11 is the compensated elasticity of demand
for good one and η1 is the income elasticity of demand for good one. Substituting
from (3.8) yields the price and income effects on the tax semi-elasticity of consumer
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demand C1
piC1 =
(
ε11 − η1ψIC1
) {χL1piw + χLSK1 [piρL + 1/(1 + τ)]}+ η1piI (3.9)
On the production side, differentiating the production function with fixed location-
specific capital and solving for the tax semi-elasticity of labor demand yields
piX1 = −χL1σ1 (piw − piρLG) (3.10)
where σ1 is the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution in production.
9 Since the
consumption and production tax semi-elasticities of the domestic good are equal,
equating (3.9) and (3.10) and solving for the tax semi-elasticity of the net return to
LSK yields
piρL =
(
ε11 − η1ψIC1 + σ1
)
χL1piw + η1piI
χL1σ1 − χLSK1
(
ε11 − η1ψIC1
) − 1
1 + τ
(3.11)
Note that in the case of Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, this expres-
sion reduces to piρL = piI − 1/(1 + τ) which indicates that — apart from the effects
of changes in income — the gross return to LSK is fixed so that the owners of LSK
bear the burden of the capital income tax in that sector. Otherwise, the first term
in (3.11) reflects the net general equilibrium effects on the return to LSK of changes
in relative prices on consumer demands and factor demands. Substituting (3.11) into
(3.8) implies that the tax semi-elasticity of the price of the domestic good is
pip1 = χL1piw + χLSK1
[(
ε11 − η1ψIC1 + σ1
)
χL1piw + η1piI
χL1σ1 − χLSK1
(
ε11 − η1ψIC1
) ] . (3.12)
Note that an income increase thus results in an increase in the relative price of the
domestic good (since the price of the multinational good is fixed).
9The Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution can be written as [∂ ln (xi) /∂ ln (pj)]/Sj , where xi
is the quantity of factor i used in production, pj is the price of factor j, and Sj is the production
cost share of factor j.
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Tax Semi-elasticity of Firm-specific Capital
To solve for piFSK , calculate the tax semi-elasticity of the multinational sector
good using the labor market equilibrium equation and the tax semi-elasticity of per-
unit labor demand, and substitute into the expression for the tax semi-elasticity of
demand for FSK to yield
piFSK =
λ1
λ2
σ1
(
piw − piρL −
1
1 + τ
)
+ σ2
[
piw − 1
1 + TK
(
∂TK
∂τ
)]
(3.13)
where λ1 = L1/L, λ2 = L2/L, and σ1, σ2 are the elasticities of substitution in pro-
duction in the domestic and multinational sectors, respectively. In the Cobb-Douglas
case, this reduces to
piFSK =
(
1 +
λ1
λ2
)
piw −
(
λ1
λ2
)
piI − 1
1 + TK
(
∂TK
∂τ
)
. (3.14)
The first term indicates that an increase in the wage reduces the relative price of
FSK (since the price of the multinational good is fixed) and thus increases demand
for FSK. The second term reflects the fact, noted above, that an increase in income
results in an increase in the relative price of the domestic good and thus the demands
for the factors producing that good, while decreasing relative factor demands for
the factors producing the multinational sector good, thus putting downward pressure
on the demand for FSK. The more general case reflects the additional net general
equilibrium effects on the demand for FSK of changes in relative prices on consumer
demands and factor demands.
Solving for the Optimal Tax Rate in the Cobb-Douglas Case
To make these expressions more tractable in solving for the optimal τ , suppose that
the production functions are Cobb-Douglas with constant labor shares χL1, χL2, and
the utility function is also Cobb-Douglas with constant expenditure shares ψIC1 , ψ
I
C2
.
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In this case, the various tax semi-elasticities reduce to
∂TK
∂τ
= (1− φS) (1− φF ) + (1− φS) [(1− φF ) τ + φF τF − τH ] pi1−φS
piw = − χFSK2
χL2 (1 + TK)
(
∂TK
∂τ
)
piρL = piI −
1
1 + τ
pip1 = χL1piw + (1− χL1) piI
piFSK =
(
1 +
λ1
λ2
)
piw −
(
λ1
λ2
)
piI − 1
1 + TK
(
∂TK
∂τ
)
piI = ψ
I
Lpiw + ψ
I
LSKpiρL +
(
R
I
)[
ψRLSKpiρL + ψ
R
FSK (piFSK + pi1−φS) +
1
τ
]
.
Substituting for piρL and piFSK and solving for the tax semi-elasticity of income yields
DτpiI =
R
I
+
[
ψIL +
(
R
I
)
ψRFSK
(
λ1
λ2
+
1
χFSK2
)]
τpiw
−
[
ψILSK +
(
R
I
)
ψRLSK
](
τ
1 + τ
)
+
(
R
I
)
ψRFSKτpi1−φS , (3.15)
where D = 1 − ψILSK −
(
R
I
)
ψRLSK +
(
R
I
) (
λ1
λ2
)
ψRFSK . Substituting pip1 = χL1piw +
(1− χL1) piI into the government’s first-order condition for τ (3.5) and multiplying
by Dτ yields
Dτ piI −D
(
ψIC1χL1
1− ψIC1χLSK1
)
τpiw = 0. (3.16)
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Substituting from the Cobb-Douglas tax semi-elasticity expressions above yields
R
I
− ΩR
(
R
I
)
= ψILSK
(
τ
1 + τ
)
+ ΩTK
(
τ
1 + TK
)(
∂TK
∂τ
)
, (3.17)
where
ΩR = ψ
R
LSK
(
τ
1 + τ
)
+ ψRFSK
[
λ1
λ2
(
χFSK2
χL2
)
+
1
χL2
− τpi1−φS
]
ΩTK =
[
ψIL −
DψIC1χL1
1− ψIC1χLSK1
](
χFSK2
χL2
)
TK = (1− φF ) (1− φS) τ + [(1− φS)φF τF + φSτH ] .
Thus, at the capital income tax rate optimum, the static increase in revenue due to
an increase in the tax rate (the first term in (3.17), R/I) is exactly offset by the net
effect on real income, including endogenous adjustments in the head tax (ΩRR/I),
and the increase in taxation of capital in the domestic sector (the second-to-last term
in (3.17)) and in the multinational sector (the last term in (3.17)).
3.3.2 Properties of the Optimal Capital Income Tax Rate
In this section, we show that our optimality condition is consistent with the basic
results discussed in the introduction on (1) zero capital income taxation, and (2)
capital income taxation at the residual tax rate. First, divide the optimality condition
(3.17) by τ and apply R = τ [ρLLSK + (1− φS) ρFFSK] so that the optimality
condition is well defined at τ = 0,
ρLLSK + (1− φS) ρFFSK
I
−
[
ψILSK +
(
R
I
)
ψRLSK
](
1
1 + τ
)
+
(
R
I
)
ψRFSKpi1−φS
−
[
DψIC1χL1
1− ψIC1χLSK1
− ψIL −
(
R
I
)
ψRFSK
(
λ1
λ2
+
1
χFSK2
)]
piw = 0.
(3.18)
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When there is a zero capital income tax rate, ψRLSK = ψ
R
FSK = TK = 0 and (3.18)
simplifies to
ρLLSK + (1− φS) ρFFSK
I
− ψILSK =
[(
1− ψILSK
)
ψIC1χL1
1− ψIC1χLSK1
− ψIL
]
piw. (3.19)
Assuming that the tax rate in the tax haven is non-zero, τH > 0, firms will not shift
income to the tax haven if the change from τ = 0 is small enough, pi1−φS = 0|τ=0. Ad-
ditionally, at τ = 0, no income shifting occurs (φS = 0), reducing the wage expression
to
piw = −χFSK2
χL2
(1− φF ) . (3.20)
Recognizing that ψIC1χLSK1 = ψ
I
LSK/θ , ψ
I
C1
χL1 = ψ
I
Lλ1, and χFSK2/χL2 = ρFFSK/wL2
at τ = 0, we can multiply this entire expression by IL2/ρFFSK to get
ψILSKI
ρFFSK
(
1− θ
θ
)
L2 + L2 =
[
L−
(
1− ψILSK
1− ψILSK/θ
)
L1
]
(1− φF ) , (3.21)
which is the condition under which a zero capital tax rate is optimal. If all location-
specific capital is owned domestically (θ = 1), the optimality condition becomes
L2 = (L− L1) (1− φF )
and a zero capital income tax is optimal only if there is no foreign residual tax.
To consider the case where a portion of location-specific capital is not owned
domestically, θ < 1, rewrite the optimality condition to the form
ψILSKI
ρFFSK
(
1− θ
θ
)
L2 =
[
L−
(
1− ψILSK
1− ψILSK/θ
)
L1
]
(1− φF )− L2. (3.22)
As long as θ < 1, 1 − ψILSK > 1 − ψILSK/θ so that L −
(
I−θρLLSK
I−ρLLSK
)
L1 < L2. Since
(1− φF ) ≤ 1, this suggests the right-hand side of (3.22) is strictly negative, while
θ < 1 implies the left-hand side of (22) is strictly positive. Consequently, optimality
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condition (3.22) never holds if θ < 1. This suggests that as long as any location-
specific capital is foreign-owned, the optimal capital tax rate is non-zero, as a portion
of location-specific capital represents immobile, foreign-owned, above-normal returns
(assuming a non-zero tax rate in the tax haven). However, if all location-specific
capital is owned domestically, the optimal capital tax rate is zero if there is no residual
tax, under the baseline assumption τH > 0.
We can also characterize the optimal capital income tax rate under full residual
taxation. If all capital income earned in sector two is subject to residual taxation
(φF = 1) and the domestic tax rate is lower than the residual tax rate (τ < τF ), the
optimality condition (3.17) reduces to
1 + τ
θ + τ
=
ρLLSK
ρLLSK + (1− φS) ρFFSK . (3.23)
By definition, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 and the expression in (2.23) cannot hold as long as some
income is unshifted, φS < 1. Consequently, if there is full residual taxation, τ < τF
is not optimal as long as any capital income in sector two is unshifted when τ = τF .
3.4 Extended Model, Parameter Values, and Simulation Re-
sults
3.4.1 Extended Model
In this section, we simulate an extended version of the model to obtain an idea
of the magnitudes of the effects of the various factors on the optimal capital income
tax rate. Specifically, we expand the individual’s optimization problem to include
endogenous labor supply, converting the head tax to a proportional tax on labor, and
allow for the possibility of endogenous labor income shifting to the capital income
tax base. Further, we add another factor in both production sectors — “ordinary”
capital (K) that earns a normal rate of return (r); we assume that this factor is
also perfectly mobile so that r is fixed. This implies that domestic production also
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includes internationally mobile capital, so that both production sectors are affected
by the capital tax rate. Both sectors thus now employ three factors in production,
which we model using CES production functions. Finally, we consider the effects
on the optimal capital income tax rate of adding an explicit tax on location-specific
capital as an additional tax instrument available to the government.
In the computational model, we use a utility function that enables calibration of
the income elasticity of labor:
v (p1, I) = max
C1,C2,L
{
αC1
(
C
1−1/γ1
1
1− 1/γ1
)
+ αC2
(
C
1−1/γ2
2
1− 1/γ2
)
+ αL
(
(H − L)1−1/γL
1− 1/γL
)}
s. t. I = wL+ θρLLSK + rKd > p1C1 + p2C2; H ≥ L. (3.24)
All variables correspond to those used in the analytical model above, with the ad-
ditional terms Kd and H indicating domestic ownership of capital and the labor
endowment, respectively, with leisure defined as H − L. The wage rate in the in-
dividual problem remains net of tax and, as will be discussed below, includes any
wages that are shifted to the business income tax base and thus subject to the capital
income tax.
Both CES production functions now account for ordinary capital (K1 and K2), or
X1 =
[
α1K1
(ξ1−1)/ξ1 + α2L1(ξ1−1)/ξ1 + (1− α1 − α2)LSK(ξ1−1)/ξ1
] ξ1
ξ1−1 (3.25)
X2 =
[
β1K2
(ξ2−1)/ξ2 + β2L2(ξ2−1)/ξ2 + (1− β1 − β2)FSK(ξ2−1)/ξ2
] ξ2
ξ2−1 , (3.26)
where ξ1 and ξ2 are the elasticities of substitution in production for sectors one and
two.
Turning next to extensions of the modeling of income shifting, Grubert and Alt-
shuler (2013) argue that the costs associated with international income shifting are
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roughly quadratic.10 Accordingly, we assume that multinationals engage in income
shifting to maximize the increment in after-tax profits attributable to such shifting,
subject to quadratic adjustment costs. Thus, the proportion of capital income shifted
to a tax haven (φS) satisfies
φS ∈ max
0≤φS≤1
{[
(τ + φF max {τF − τ, 0} − τH)φS − ηφS2
]
(rK2 + ρFFSK)
}
, (3.27)
and the total per-unit cost of both types of capital to the multinational sector with
income shifting is 1 + (1− φS) [τ + φF max (τF − τ, 0)] + φSτH + ηφ2S.
In the domestic economy, some individuals are assumed to be able to shift labor
income to the business tax base when the capital income tax rate is lower than the
labor income tax rate. Such shifting maximizes the associated increment in after-tax
wage income, again subject to quadratic adjustment costs. Only a limited portion
(ωI) of labor income, corresponding roughly to the share of labor income earned
from self-employment or in small closely-held corporations, can potentially be shifted.
Consequently, the proportion of labor income shifted to the capital income tax base
(φI) satisfies
φI = ωIa
∣∣∣∣a ∈ max0≤a≤1 {a (τL − τ)wL− µa2wL} . (3.28)
With φE indicating the share of wage income exempt from labor taxation, the gross
wage rate, including shifting costs, is
wG = φEw + (1− φE)w
[
(1− φI) (1 + τL) + φI (1 + τ) + µφ2I
]
.
Government revenue comes from three tax instruments: a capital income tax, a labor
income tax, and (in some cases) a direct tax on location-specific capital. A fixed share
(φLSK) of LSK is subject to the direct tax, and any of these taxes paid are deductible
from the capital income tax base, so the total tax revenue raised from location-specific
10Most of this discussion is included in their online Appendix A, http://econweb.rutgers.edu/
altshule/Fixing-appendices.pdf.
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capital income is RLSK = φLSK [τLSK + τ (1− τLSK)] ρLLSK + (1− φLSK) τρLLSK.
Accounting for income shifting behavior, total revenue raised from the taxation of
labor income is RL = τL (1− φI)wL+ τφIwL and total revenue raised from ordinary
and firm-specific capital income is R = τ {r [K1 + (1− φS)K2] + (1− φS) ρFFSK}.
In our simulations, we treat the location-specific capital tax rate as exogenous, ef-
fectively assuming there is a maximum feasible level of LSK taxation. The welfare-
maximizing government chooses the capital income tax rate and the labor income tax
rate according to
max
τL, τ
{v (p1, I)| p2G = RL +RLSK +R} . (3.29)
3.4.2 Parameter Values
In this section, we describe the parameter values used in our model. In the
simulations, we consider a wide range of values for numerous key parameters.
Production Function Parameter Values
The appropriate value for the elasticity of substitution in production is a con-
tentious issue. Many simulation studies (e.g., Altig et al., 2001; Fehr et al., 2013)
assume Cobb-Douglas production functions, and a relatively large degree of substi-
tutability seems appropriate for our model given that two of our inputs are different
types of capital. Accordingly, in our benchmark case, we assume a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, that is, a unitary elasticity of substitution in production. However,
Chirinko (2002) argues that a much lower elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor is appropriate; his preferred estimate is 0.4. Accordingly, we calibrate our
simulation model for a wide range of substitution elasticities, varying from the Cobb-
Douglas case (ξ1 = ξ2 = 1) to an elasticity of substitution in production as low as
ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.25 (Table 1).
In a recent paper that documents the decline in the labor share of income since
the 1980s, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) estimate a global corporate labor share
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Table 3.1 : Optimal Capital Taxation Model, Optimal Tax Rates, and Welfare Effects,
as a Function of the Elasticity of Substitution in Production
Varying the Elasticity of Substitution
ξi = 1.00 ξi = 0.85 ξi = 0.70 ξi = 0.55 ξi = 0.40 ξi = 0.25
G 0.198 0.2012 0.2055 0.211 0.217 0.2247
Kd 4.5 4.55 4.6 4.62 4.68 4.73
LSK 1.37 1.39 1.42 1.46 1.495 1.528
α1 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176
α2 0.525 0.509 0.482 0.437 0.353 0.185
β1 0.148 0.152 0.157 0.162 0.177 0.208
β2 0.6 0.62 0.65 0.69 0.725 0.753
aL 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
aC1 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15
aC2 4.08 4.05 3.96 3.8 3.65 3.38
γ1 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.615
γ2 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22
γL 0.413 0.412 0.415 0.417 0.418 0.421
Invariant Parameters
τF
1+τF
= 0.20 p2 = 0.9 φLSK = 0 θ = 0.8 µ = 0.16 ωI = 0.35
τH
1+τH
= 0.05 r = 0.1 φE = 0.35 H = 2.85 η = 0.65
τLSK
1+τLSK
= 0.375 ρF = 0.35 φF = 0.01
Optimal Tax Rates
τ∗
1+τ∗ 0.160 0.165 0.170 0.177 0.182 0.188
τ∗L
1+τ∗L
0.241 0.236 0.230 0.223 0.216 0.210
Excess Burden (% of Capital Income Tax Revenue at Initial Calibration Point)
τ
1+τ
= 0.18 0.53% 0.29% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.06%
τ
1+τ
= 0.00 4.97% 5.92% 7.03% 8.08% 8.64% 8.75%
Capital Investment Changes Under Reform (τ = 0.00→ τ ∗)
%∆ (K1 +K2) -29.36% -24.90% -20.28% -15.60% -11.04% -6.33%
%∆FSK -46.31% -39.41% -32.34% -25.22% -18.35% 11.08%
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of around 60 percent, and an overall labor share of around 52.5 percent. We assume
that the labor share in sector one (the domestic sector) corresponds to the global
share (α2 = 0.525) and the labor share in sector two (the multinational corporate
sector) corresponds to the global corporate share (β2 = 0.60).
Cronin et al. (2013) estimate that roughly 63 percent of corporate income is due
to above-normal returns. Given a corporate labor income share of 60 percent, we
choose the shares of ordinary capital and firm-specific capital to be consistent with
the Cronin et al. estimate. That is, we choose our parameters so that the ratio of the
total earnings attributable to above-normal returns to FSK, defined as the excess
of actual returns to FSK over the returns to ordinary capital, to the total earnings
from the normal returns to ordinary capital is 1.7 (=0.63/(1–0.63)). This in turn
implies that the ordinary capital and FSK shares in the MNC production function
are β1 = 0.148 and 1 − β1 − β2 = 0.252. Similarly, assuming a labor share of 52.5
percent in the domestic sector implies α1 = 0.176 and 1− α1 − α2 = 0.299.
To calibrate the relative rate of return to FSK, we consider the literature studying
the rate of return to investment in research and development. In a study of UK firms,
Greenhalgh and Rogers (2006) find that the ratio of the shadow value of intangible to
tangible assets is 3.5, but that this ratio varies considerably by sector, from 2.34 for
software firms to 7.97 for production intensive firms. Following their baseline result,
we set r = 0.1 and ρF = 0.35.
It is less clear how the rate of return to LSK should compare to the return to or-
dinary capital. Hou and Robinson (2006) find that in the United States firms in more
concentrated markets earn lower stock market returns, while Gallagher, Ignatieva,
and McCulloch (2015) find that in Australia firms in more concentrated markets are
able to earn excess returns. Gallagher, Ignatieva, and McCulloch hypothesize that a
more rigorous regulatory environment in United States explains this difference. Given
this ambiguity, we choose a rate of return to LSK that is only 25 percent higher than
the rate earned by ordinary capital, ρL = 0.125.
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Utility Function Parameters
In 2012, foreign-controlled enterprises produced 37 percent of total GDP in the
EU countries.11 Accordingly, the MNC produces 37 percent of GDP in our base
case. To achieve this, we set the consumption share parameters for the representative
resident at αC1 = 6.15 and αC2 = 4.08. The various γ parameters determine the
responsiveness of consumption and labor supply to changes in prices (including the
wage) and income. We calibrate our demand price elasticity for the multinational
good to -1.1 (γ2 = 1.22), consistent with Senhadji’s (1998) estimate that the average
long-run price elasticity of import demand is slightly higher than one. Seale and
Regmi (2006) estimate price elasticities across good types for a wide selection of
countries; we select an intermediate value for the uncompensated price elasticity of
the domestic good of -0.8 (γ1 = 0.615).
Turning to the labor supply parameters, in a Congressional Budget Office survey
of recent research on labor supply elasticities, McClelland and Mok (2012) conclude
that the substitution elasticity of labor supply for the total population in the U.S.
is between 0.1 and 0.3, and that the income elasticity is between -0.1 and zero.
Accordingly, we set the parameters of our utility function so that the labor supply
substitution elasticity is 0.2, and the income elasticity is -0.05; this implies γL = 0.413
and αL = 7.3. Note that these parameter values yield an uncompensated labor supply
elasticity of 0.15, a value that is consistent with the consensus estimates in McClelland
and Mok (2012) and comparable to the value of 0.18 used by Jacobs (2009).
Government Spending and Tax Rates
We fix government services, which are assumed to be separable from the individual
utility function, at roughly 16 percent of national income. This is consistent with
11Authors’ calculations based on data from Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/
database, “GDP and main components” and “Foreign control of enterprises by economic activity
and a selection of controlling countries.”
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the average level (16.2 percent) reported by The World Bank’s World Development
Indicators for high-FDI countries between 2000 and 2013.12
As discussed above, our “capital income tax rate” is a proxy for several con-
cepts of capital income taxation, including statutory and various effective tax rates.
We calibrate our model at a capital tax rate of τ/(1 + τ) = 0.18, which reflects
the average effective business-level capital income tax rate estimated by Pricewater-
houseCoopers (2011) for high-FDI countries.13 Under our base case assumption that
the elasticity of substitution in production is ξ1 = ξ2 = 1.0, this implies a labor tax
rate of τL/ (1 + τL) = 0.22. This labor tax rate, which is endogenously determined to
balance the government budget constraint, assumes that 35 percent of labor income
is exempted from the tax base (φE = 0.35), reflecting provisions such as standard
deductions, personal exemptions, and a variety of other deductions and exclusions.
For example, in 2013, about 69 percent of the income reported on US tax returns was
taxable, a figure that overstates the share of taxable income since filers with very low
income levels are not required to file US tax returns.14
Globally, taxes on domestic natural resources vary considerably. In a recent survey,
the International Monetary Fund (2012) reports high average effective tax rates on
extractive industries. For the petroleum industry, these rates are generally between 65
and 85 percent of net present value. For mining industries, rates are somewhat lower,
ranging from 45 to 65 percent. Accordingly, in our benchmark case, the direct tax on
location-specific capital is set at 60 percent (τLSK = 0.6). We initially assume that
12We identify high-FDI countries as those whose average (2000–2013) foreign direct investment
(FDI) net inflows as a share of GDP are in the top 50 percent reported internationally. This
corresponds to countries whose FDI net inflows average above 3.7 percent of GDP between 2000
and 2013. These data were obtained from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?
source=world-development-indicators.
13The unweighted average of effective tax rates for high-FDI countries (as defined in footnote 11)
in this study is 17.5 percent, rising to 19.2 percent if the samples is restricted to countries with at
least 10 observations.
14See IRS SOI Tax Statistics, “Table 1.1 All Returns: Selected In-
come and Tax Items, Tax Year 2013,” https://www.irs.gov/uac/
SOI-Tax-Stats---Individual-Statistical-Tables-by-Size-of-Adjusted-Gross-Income.
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none of the location-specific capital is subject to this tax, φLSK = 0, since LSK does
not necessarily represent extraction activity, but consider the full range of possible
values in our simulations (0 ≤ φLSK ≤ 1).
As discussed in the introduction, in most circumstances the fraction of firm-specific
capital that is subject to residual taxation in the home country (φF ) is likely be
relatively small. However, it may be significant for (1) countries attempting to attract
a significant share of their foreign direct investment from US-based MNCs that are
not (and are not likely to be) in an excess foreign tax credit position, or (2) countries
with tax rates that are (or will become with reform) sufficiently low that they trigger
current residual home country taxation under various anti-base-erosion provisionsa
category that may increase over time as more countries adopt such provisions.15 In
our base case, we assume that the fraction of firm-specific capital that is subject to
residual taxation is very small (φF = 0.01) and subject to a gross residual tax rate
of 20 percent. However, we simulate a wide variety of potential residual taxation
scenarios, including 0.05 ≤ τF/ (1 + τF ) ≤ 0.30 and 0 ≤ φF ≤ 0.30, corresponding to
the range of values that might arise under anti-base-erosion provisions.
Finally, we assume that the effective tax haven rate is τH/ (1 + τH) = 0.05, re-
flecting a combination of very low tax haven rates coupled with the costs of shifting
income and deferring repatriation, which Grubert and Altshuler (2013) suggest range
from 1–7 percent.
Income Shifting Parameters
There is considerable disagreement about the fraction of capital income that is
currently shifted abroad. Riedel (2014) surveys the literature on international tax
avoidance and reports a range of 5 percent (found in the United Kingdom by HMRC
(2014)) to 30 percent (found in the United States by Clausing (2011)). In her most
15In fact, as controlled foreign corporation rules become more common, it may be reasonable to
model the level of residual taxation as a function of the domestic tax rate since these rules only apply
to countries with low corporate income tax rates. We leave this consideration to future analysis.
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recent work, Clausing (2016) estimates that the amount of income shifted from the US
corporate income tax base is 32–46 percent of current revenues. In our benchmark
case, we adopt a fairly conservative assumption that income shifting is 15 percent
of the corporate tax base (φS/(1 − φS) = 0.15 or φS = 0.13).16’17 Under the tax
rates assumed in the model, this implies that the capital income shifting parameter
is η = 0.65. However, given the uncertainty about the extent of income shifting,
we simulate a wide range of values for the share of income that is shifted abroad,
0.05 ≤ φS/(1− φS) ≤ 0.50.
There is considerably less literature on the shifting of labor income to the corpo-
rate income tax base. However, we expect the share of labor income shifted to be
modest, as relatively few individuals both have the capability to shift labor income
and potentially benefit from it. The two groups most likely to engage in labor in-
come shifting are the self-employed and individuals working in small corporations.
According to The World Bank’s World Development Indicators, about 35 percent of
the employed population in high-FDI countries is self-employed, while in a sample
of 20 OECD countries, around 24 percent of individuals work for companies with
10 or fewer employees.18 Accordingly, in our benchmark case we set ωI = 0.35 and
also consider cases where up to 50 percent of labor income can potentially be shifted.
Given our assumption that 35 percent of labor income is exempt from taxation, we
16This aligns closely with the Dyreng and Markle (2015) estimate that income shifting the United
States is roughly 13 percent of revenues — although they note that because their sample size is
relatively small, their estimate is not necessarily inconsistent with larger estimates such as those
found by Clausing (2011).
17Estimates of the tax semi-elasticity of income shifting provide another indicator of the degree
of uncertainty about the extent of income shifting. For example, Clausing notes that her larger
estimate implies a tax semi-elasticity of 3.3. This value, however, is relatively large in comparison
to most others found in the literature; for example, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) argue that
the consensus estimate of the tax semi-elasticity of income shifting is 0.8, although Clausing (2016)
argues that most of the papers cited in this study use data that does not adequately capture income
shifting to tax havens.
18This calculation is based on values from OCED (2012). The 20 countries with available data
include Austria, Belgium, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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then assume 75 percent of remaining labor income is taxed at a rate exceeding the
capital income tax rate. Additionally, we simply assume that a quarter of this poten-
tially shiftable income is actually shifted to the corporate tax base. This calculation
suggests that about 7 percent of labor income is shifted to the corporate tax base
(φI/ (1− φI) = 0.07), implying µ = 0.16. With 7 percent of labor income shifted
to the corporate tax base, 8.7 percent of revenue raised by the capital tax reflects
revenue raised from taxation of shifted labor income. This figure is slightly below the
range of 10 to 17 percent labor income shifting estimated in for the EU by de Mooij
and Nicodme (2006).19
Other Parameters
Sercu and Vanpe (2007) examine a sample of 42 countries and estimate that the
share of domestically-owned equity capital in total market capitalization is 80 percent.
Accordingly, we assume in our benchmark case that the domestically-owned share of
the location-specific capital is θ = 0.8. In the simulations, we consider the full range
of possibilities for this parameter, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
3.4.3 Simulation Results
As mentioned above, we calibrate our model for various values of the elasticity of
substitution in production, ranging from ξ1 = ξ2 = 1 to ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.25, using the
Cobb-Douglas formulation as the benchmark. In Table 1, we present the parameters
used for calibration and welfare analysis for each 0.15 increment over this range of
the production substitution elasticity.
Note that as the elasticity of substitution in production declines, the optimal
capital income tax rate rises, as capital income taxation is less distortionary if capital-
19Our estimates may be conservative. Gordon and Slemrod (2000) estimate that a one percentage
point decrease in the differential between the labor income and businesss tax rates leads to a fairly
large 2.9 percent increase in personal income. When we simulate the effects of a small change in this
tax rate differential at the initial equilibrium in our model, we obtain a smaller tax semi-elasticity
of -1.36.
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labor substitution in production is more difficult. For example, when the elasticity
of substitution in production is ξ1 = ξ2 = 1, the optimal capital income tax rate is
τ ∗ /(1 + τ∗) = 0.160, but as the production elasticity declines to ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.25, the
optimal capital income tax rate increases by nearly 18 percent to τ ∗/(1+τ∗) = 0.188.
In addition, as the optimal capital income tax rate approaches the level in our
baseline, τ/(1+τ) = 0.180, the welfare gains associated with reform — defined as the
equivalent variation associated with moving from the benchmark initial equilibrium
to the optimal capital income tax rate — naturally approach zero.20 For example,
at the substitution elasticity ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.40, the optimal capital income tax rate
τ∗/(1+τ∗) = 0.182 is very close to the observed rate, so that capital income tax reform
produces negligible welfare gains. By comparison, moving to the optimal capital
income tax rate in the Cobb-Douglas case is equivalent to receiving a transfer in the
initial equilibrium equal to 0.53 percent of CIT revenues. Alternatively, consider the
effects of moving from no taxation of capital income to the optimal capital income tax
rate. In the Cobb-Douglas case, this results in a welfare gain equivalent to a transfer
worth 4.97 percent of CIT revenues. However, at lower elasticities of substitution
in production, the distortionary effects of capital income taxation are smaller, so
the welfare gains associated with introducing a positive capital income tax rate are
generally larger; for example, moving to the optimal capital income tax rate results
in a welfare gain worth 8.75 percent of CIT revenues in the case of an elasticity of
substitution in production of 0.25.
In our benchmark calibration, 35 percent of labor income can be potentially be
shifted (ωI = 0.35), only 1 percent of MNC capital income is subject to residual
taxation (φF = 0.01), there is no direct taxation of LSK (φLSK = 0), and 20 percent
of LSK is foreign-owned (θ = 0.8). In this case, the optimal capital income tax rate
is τ ∗ /(1 + τ∗) = 0.160 and the labor income tax rate, which is determined as a
20Equivalent variation is measured as the income transfer that would make the individual indif-
ferent between receiving the transfer and remaining in the initial equilibrium and moving to the
equilibrium that occurs with the move to the optimal capital income tax rate.
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residual from the government budget constraint, is τL/ (1 + τL) = 0.241.
The results of various simulations of the model are shown in Figures 3.1–3.7,
where the benchmark calibration, when included, is indicated with a triangle. The
basic variations on the benchmark result are illustrated in Figures 3.1a-c, which show
the optimal capital income tax rates for various assumptions about the share of LSK
owned by foreigners (1−θ), the share of labor income that can be feasibly shifted (ωI),
and the fraction of unshifted income subject to residual taxation (φF ). Note that,
in contrast to our main result in the analytical model, the optimal capital income
tax rate is not zero even when all location-specific capital is owned domestically and
there is no residual taxation, since a portion of the capital income tax base (LSK)
is inelastic.21 However, the optimal capital income tax rate is small when there is no
residual taxation, no potential for labor income shifting, and no foreign ownership of
LSK, as the optimal rate is less than 3 percent, τ ∗ /(1 + τ∗) = 0.027(not shown).
Thus, considered in isolation, the opportunity to tax immobile location-specific rents
accruing to domestic residents does not provide much of a rationale for capital income
taxation in the model.
With only 1 percent of capital in the multinational sector subject to residual
taxation and no labor income shifting, Figure 3.1a shows that the optimal capital
income tax rate is roughly linear with respect to the share of LSK that is owned by
foreigners, beginning at τ/ (1 + τ) = 0.03 when the foreign-owned share of LSK is
zero and reaching a maximum of τ/ (1 + τ) = 0.26 when all of LSK is foreign-owned.
Thus, the opportunity to tax foreign rents may provide an important rationale for
taxing capital income, as stressed by Huizinga and Nielsen (1997). At the benchmark
level of foreign ownership of 20 percent (with minimal residual taxation and no income
shifting), the optimal capital income tax rate is τ ∗ /(1 + τ∗) = 0.077, which implies
21Tests removing LSK from domestic production indicate that the optimal capital tax rate is zero
(with no residual taxation) as long as all capital investment is perfectly mobile, since the elasticity of
labor supply is finite but non-zero. Note also that the presence of LSK does not produce a positive
optimal capital income tax rate in our analytical model because the alternative of taxing fixed labor
supply has no distortionary cost in that case.
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a labor income tax rate of τL/ (1 + τL) = 0.293.
Figure 3.1a also shows that adding the possibility of a treasury transfer effect by
including residual taxation increases the optimal capital income tax rate, but only
until the domestic tax rate equals the assumed residual tax rate of 20 percent. Recall
that in the analytical model with full residual taxation, the optimal capital tax rate is
at least as high as the foreign tax rate. By expanding the model to include ordinary
capital in both sectors, we include some mobile capital that we assume is not subject
to residual taxation (K1). Although this diminishes the importance of the underlying
treasury transfer effect, the presence of a residual tax still moves the optimal capital
income tax rate toward the foreign tax rate. In all cases, the optimal tax rate plateaus
at the assumed residual tax rate τF/ (1 + τF ) = 0.20. Once this limit is reached, the
optimal capital income tax rate remains constant until the foreign-owned share of
LSK is large enough (in excess of 70 percent) to justify further increases, up to the
maximum rate of 26.4 percent which occurs when all LSK is foreign-owned.
The same general pattern occurs in Figures 3.1b and 3.1c. However, these figures
show that the sensitivity of the optimal capital income tax rate to foreign ownership
of LSK depends heavily on the opportunity for labor income shifting. In all cases,
the optimal capital income tax rate is 26.4 percent when all LSK is foreign-owned.
However, at lower values of the foreign-owned share of LSK, the optimal capital
income tax rate generally increases as labor-income shifting opportunities increase,
as increased capital income taxation allows lower labor income tax rates, both of
which reduce the incentive for labor income shifting, which reduces revenues and
incurs costs. For example, when 35 (50) percent of labor income can be feasibly
shifted to the capital income tax base, the optimal capital income tax rate rises to
τ ∗ /(1 + τ∗) = 0.153 (0.172), even with minimal residual taxation and no foreign-
ownership of LSK. This of course reduces the sensitivity of the optimal capital
income tax rate to variation in the share of LSK that is foreign-owned.
Figure 3.2 illustrates that if some direct taxation of location-specific capital is
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Figure 3.1 : Varying Labor Income Shifting, Foreign Ownership of LSK, and Residual
Taxation
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Figure 3.1a - No Income Labor Income Shifting
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Figure 3.1b - 35% of Labor Income Feasibly Shifted
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Figure 3.1c - 50% of Labor Income Feasibly Shifted
1% Residual Taxation 10% Residual Taxation 20% Residual Taxation
Note: All parameters are set to base-case values unless otherwise indicated. For these figures, this
implies that there is no direct taxation of LSK, 35% of labor income is exempt from taxation, the
elasticity of substitution in production is one, the gross residual tax rate is 20%, and 1% of capital
in the multinational sector is subject to residual taxation.
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available (under the assumption that direct taxes paid on location-specific rents are
deductible from the capital income tax), the optimal capital income tax rate declines
significantly. As discussed above, this occurs because an alternative tax instrument
can be used to extract rents from the owners of location-specific rents, including
foreigners, without the negative consequences on capital flight and capital income
shifting associated with use of the capital income tax. For example, under our base-
case assumption that 20 percent of location-specific capital is foreign-owned, the
optimal capital income tax rate drops from τ ∗ /(1 + τ∗) = 0.16 or 16 percent to
7.1 percent if all rents from LSK can be taxed directly.22 And, if all LSK is foreign-
owned, the optimal capital income tax rate drops from 26.4 percent to 9.4 percent. In
addition, the sensitivity of the optimal capital income tax rate with respect to foreign
ownership of LSK declines with direct taxation, since rents earned by foreigners can
be taxed directly. Indeed, in the extreme case in which all location-specific capital can
be taxed directly, the optimal capital income tax barely increases with the foreign-
owned share of LSK (from τ ∗/(1+τ∗) = 0.066 with θ = 1 to τ ∗/(1+τ∗) = 0.094 with
θ = 0). This slight increase occurs because above-normal returns to foreign-owned
LSK are still included in the capital income tax base, with the direct tax on LSK
deductible.
We turn next to the sensitivity of the results to changes in firm production function
parameters. Figure 3.3 examines the interaction of the relative capital shares in
the production of the domestic good with the availability of a direct tax on LSK.
Specifically, consider an increase in the production cost share of LSK coupled with
a reduction in the production cost share of ordinary capital. When there is no direct
taxation of LSK, this increases the optimal capital income tax rate, as LSK is a
22The optimal capital income tax rate does not drop to zero because it is still desirable to raise
capital income revenue, reducing the labor income tax rate and the corresponding incentive for labor
income shifting. If labor income shifting were impossible, the optimal capital income tax rate would
be very near zero in this case (1.7 percent), even with variable labor supply. This small amount of
capital taxation persists because LSK is still included in the capital income tax base (although the
direct tax on LSK is fully deductible).
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Figure 3.2 : Optimal Capital Income Tax Rates and Taxation of Location-Specific
Capital
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greater share of the capital tax base. However, when LSK is taxed directly, any
increases in the relative cost share of LSK increase the revenue raised from the
direct taxation of LSK, lowering the optimal capital income tax rate (as well as the
corresponding labor income tax rate since more revenue is available). For example,
in the absence of direct LSK taxation, increasing the cost-share ratio for LSK to
ordinary capital from 0.5 to 3.0 (the benchmark value is 1.7) increases the optimal
capital income tax rate from τ ∗ /(1 + τ∗) = 0.147 to τ ∗ /(1 + τ∗) = 0.172, while the
labor income tax rate (not shown) declines from τL/ (1 + τL) = 0.259 to τL/ (1 + τL) =
0.229. However, if all LSK is taxed directly, the optimal capital income tax rate
declines from τ ∗ /(1 + τ∗) = 0.103 to τ ∗ /(1 + τ∗) = 0.059 and the labor income tax
rate declines from τL/ (1 + τL) = 0.224 to τL/ (1 + τL) = 0.123.
Figure 3.4 demonstrates that the amount of residual taxation is generally more
influential in determining the optimal capital income tax rate than the residual tax
rate. Changes in the residual tax rate have no effect on the optimal capital income
tax rate so long as the residual tax rate is less than the domestic optimal capital
income tax rate, which, in our base case, is as long as τF/ (1 + τF ) ≤ 0.160. However,
once the residual tax rate exceeds 16 percent, the optimal capital income tax rate
equals the residual tax rate until the level of capital income taxation takes maximum
advantage of the treasury transfer effect for the given amount of income subject
to residual taxation (the kink point in each of the four graphs lies in the range
0.16 ≤ τF/(1 + τF ) ≤ 0.20). Beyond that point, the optimal capital income tax rate
increases only slightly with increases in the residual tax rate.
In our benchmark calibration, 35 percent of labor income is exempt from labor
taxation, producing a base-case optimal capital income tax rate of τ ∗ /(1 + τ∗) =
0.160 and a corresponding labor income tax rate of τL/ (1 + τL) = 0.241. However,
Figure 3.5 shows that as the amount of taxable labor income declines, higher marginal
tax rates on labor income are needed to raise revenue, increasing the labor-leisure
distortion and the amount of labor income shifting associated with labor taxation.
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Figure 3.3 : Optimal Capital Income Tax Rates and Domestic Capital Intensity
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tax rate is 20%, and 1% of capital in the multinational sector is subject to residual taxation.
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Figure 3.4 : Optimal Capital Income Tax Rates and Residual Taxation
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Note: All parameters are set to base-case values unless otherwise indicated. For this figure, this
implies 35% of labor income can be feasibly shifted, 35% of labor income is exempt from taxation,
the elasticity of substitution in production is one, 20% of LSK is foreign-owned, and there is no
direct taxation of LSK.
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For example, with the 35 percent exemption, labor income shifting is calibrated to
φI/ (1− φI) = 0.07 (or 7 percent), but if 25 percent of income is exempt, shifted labor
income decreases to 4.8 percent of taxable unshifted income. With these decreases
in the distortionary cost of labor taxation, the optimal capital income tax rate also
decreases modestly (from 16 percent to 15 percent). Consequently, as the amount of
exempt labor income increases, both the optimal capital income and labor income tax
rates increase. However, Figure 3.5 demonstrates that the labor income tax increases
more in response to labor exemptions than does the optimal capital income tax rate,
which is only moderately sensitive to changes in the share of exempt labor income.
Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, differences in opportunities for international
income shifting have relatively little effect on the optimal capital income tax rate
in the model. The simulation results presented in Figure 3.6 examine the effects
of changes in the share of capital income shifted to the tax haven — achieved by
changing the international income shifting cost parameter — on the optimal capital
income tax rate, for three levels of residual taxation. Holding all other parameters at
their base-case values and adjusting capital income shifting costs so that the share of
capital income shifted to a tax haven in the base case increases from 5 percent to 50
percent, the optimal capital income tax declines only from τ ∗ /(1 + τ∗) = 0.162 to
τ ∗ /(1 + τ∗) = 0.155.
This relatively small effect reflects three offsetting effects of an increase in inter-
national income shifting opportunities on the optimal capital income tax rate. First,
as international income shifting increases due to lower shifting costs, the size of the
domestic capital income tax base decreases so that the revenue raised by the capital
income tax declines; the government’s desire to avoid this revenue loss puts downward
pressure on the optimal capital income tax rate. Second, since location-specific capi-
tal cannot be shifted internationally, increased capital income shifting implies a larger
share of the capital income tax base is immobile; this makes capital income taxation
relatively more attractive and puts upward pressure on the optimal capital income
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Figure 3.5 : Optimal Tax Rates and Labor Income Exemptions
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Note: All parameters are set to base-case values unless otherwise indicated. For this figure, this
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the elasticity of substitution in production is one, 20% of LSK is foreign-owned, there is no direct
taxation of LSK, the gross residual tax rate is 20%, and 1% of capital in the multinational sector
is subject to residual taxation.
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Figure 3.6 : Income Shifting and Residual Taxation
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tax rate. Third, as international capital income shifting increases, the negative effect
on foreign direct investment of higher capital income taxes is muted, as foreign MNCs
recognize that the cost of a higher domestic statutory tax rate is diminished by the
potential to shift some of the income earned to a low tax jurisdiction — the cost of
capital in the multinational sector is less affected by the statutory rate in the presence
of income shifting, implying foreign direct investment is less sensitive to the capital
income tax rate. This makes capital income taxation less costly to the government
and puts upward pressure on the optimal capital income tax rate.
These three effects are illustrated in Figures 3.7a-c. Figure 3.7a shows the capital
tax base, relative to the base case, as a function of the capital income tax rate for dif-
ferent levels of international income shifting costs. It demonstrates that lower shifting
costs, which lead to more capital income shifting, result in a smaller capital income
tax base and thus revenue losses for the domestic government, putting downward
pressure on the optimal capital income tax rate.
Figure 3.7b shows the LSK share of the capital income tax base as a function of
the capital income tax rate for different levels of international income shifting costs.
It demonstrates that lower shifting costs, which lead to more capital income shifting,
result in a larger relative share of the capital tax base for LSK, making capital
income taxation more attractive and thus putting upward pressure on the optimal
capital income tax rate.
Finally, Figure 3.7c shows MNC investment, relative to the base case, as a function
of the capital income tax rate for different levels of international income shifting costs.
It demonstrates that lower shifting costs, which lead to more capital income shifting,
result in slightly more investment at each value of the capital tax rate, as the potential
for income shifting dampens the effect of capital income taxation on MNC investment.
Figure 3.6 indicates that the last two factors are not large enough to offset the first
factor described above, so that the optimal capital income tax rate declines, but only
slightly, as the amount of international income shifting increases.
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Figure 3.7 : Income Shifting and Capital Investment
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Figure 3.7a - The Effects of Income Shifting on the Capital Tax Base
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Figure 3.7c - The Effects of Income Shifting on MNC Capital Investment
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Figure 3.7b - The Effects of Income Shifting on the LSK Share of the Capital Tax 
Base
Note: All parameters are set to base-case values unless otherwise indicated. For this figure, this
implies 35% of labor income can be feasibly shifted, 35% of labor income is exempt from taxation,
the elasticity of substitution in production is one, 20% of LSK is foreign-owned, there is no direct
taxation of LSK, the gross residual tax rate is 20%, and 1% of capital in the multinational sector
is subject to residual taxation. The low shifting cost is chosen so 50% of capital income is shifted
internationally in the base case. The high shifting cost is chosen so 5% of capital income is shifted
internationally in the base case.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the optimal taxation of capital income for a small open
economy that is attempting to balance the wide variety of factors that bear on the
decision to impose a source-based tax on capital. On the one hand, the standard
argument — the burden of a capital income tax imposed on internationally mobile
capital will be borne entirely by local factors — suggests that the optimal capital
income tax rate is zero. This argument is reinforced by concerns that mobile capital
may include highly productive firm-specific capital owned by MNCs that earns above-
normal returns, and that high capital income tax rates may induce international
income shifting by MNCs that will reduce revenues, perhaps significantly. On the
other hand, some capital income taxation is desirable even in a small open economy
to tax above-normal returns earned by location-specific capital, especially to the
extent that capital is owned by foreigners, to limit the shifting of labor income to the
capital income tax base, and to take advantage of any “treasury transfer” effects that
may be available. An additional complicating factor is that the opportunity to shift
income internationally may mitigate the negative effects of higher capital income tax
rates on FDI (since MNCs will know that the effects of a relatively high tax rate
will be dampened via income shifting) and will increase the relative capital share of
location-specific capital, increasing the relative desirability of more capital income
taxation.
Our base analysis confirms the standard results: if all foreign-owned capital is
perfectly mobile and there is no residual taxation, the optimal capital income tax
rate is zero, while with full residual taxation, the optimal capital income tax rate
never falls below the foreign residual tax rate as the government takes maximum
advantage of the treasury transfer effects. But in the more relevant and more general
cases, the optimal capital income tax rate falls between these two extremes, and is
typically below the tax rate applied to labor income.
The simulation results of course depend on the model specification and parame-
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ter values used. Subject to that caveat, the simulations provide several noteworthy
results. First, although the opportunity to tax immobile location-specific rents accru-
ing to domestic residents does not provide a significant rationale for capital income
taxation in our benchmark case, the optimal capital income tax rate increases ap-
proximately linearly as the fraction of location-specific rents that accrue to foreigners
increases, in some cases exceeding the tax rate on labor income. Second, an oper-
ative treasury transfer effect provides a strong rationale for capital income taxation
— an effect that currently is not likely to be very important, but may become much
more relevant over time, especially as domestic capital income tax rates decline, if
more countries enact strict anti-base-erosion provisions. Third, the potential for la-
bor income shifting puts upward pressure on capital income tax rates to reduce the
labor-capital income tax differential, and also tends to reduce the variation in capital
income tax rates. Fourth, the availability of a separate tax on the income earned
by location-specific capital significantly reduces optimal capital income tax rates; for
example, in the resource sector, this could be a separate income tax on LSK earn-
ings or a resource rent tax (or any cash flow-based tax) that would apply tax only
to the rents earned in that sector. Fifth, the optimal capital income tax rate is only
moderately sensitive to wide variations in the shares of location-specific and ordinary
capital. Sixth, the amount of residual taxation is generally more influential in de-
termining the optimal capital income tax rate than the residual tax rate. Seventh,
several offsetting effects of international income shifting imply that the optimal cap-
ital tax rate is only marginally sensitive to the costs of international income shifting,
declining slightly as such costs decrease and the amount of income shifting increases.
These simulations suggest that determining the optimal level of source-based capi-
tal income taxation is indeed a difficult problem.23 For many countries, various factors
23There are of course numerous other factors not considered in our model that would also impact
this decision (see, for example, Auerbach (2008) and Zodrow (2007)); in particular, we consider only
business level taxation and ignore equity concerns. One particularly interesting factor is the extent
to which capital income taxation can serve as a proxy for welfare-enhancing age-specific taxation
(Erosa and Gervais, 2002; Weinzierl, 2011).
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are likely to make the standard argument for complete exemption of capital income
from source-based taxation an incomplete guide to tax policy, as some taxation of
capital income is desirable under most circumstances. The primary exception is when
a separate tax can be applied to much or all of the income of location-specific capital
(or such capital is an insignificant factor in production); in this case, optimal capital
income tax rates are quite low, and administrative concerns suggest that maintaining
capital income taxation only to tax capital income at a very low rate may not be
desirable.
At the same time, the optimal level of capital income taxation in our simula-
tions is typically significantly below the tax rate applied to labor income, especially
as the share of labor income exempt from taxation decreases, suggesting that the
standard comprehensive income tax approach is not likely to be desirable either. In-
stead, more flexible tax systems, such as the dual income tax systems observed in
several Nordic countries and elsewhere, may be optimal as they can achieve a balance
between capital and labor income taxation that is best suited to the circumstances
of a particular country — assuming that income shifting from the relatively highly
taxed labor income base to the relatively lowly taxed capital income tax base can be
controlled.
We note that the prospect of residual taxation can potentially play an important
role in determining the optimal capital income tax rate. This is currently a rela-
tively unimportant issue, since the United States is the only major country with a
residence-based system and tempers its effects by allowing deferral of tax until funds
are repatriated to a US parent and allowing generous cross-crediting of foreign tax
credits. Nevertheless, residual taxation may become a more important factor, espe-
cially at relatively low levels of domestic capital income taxation, if more countries
introduce current residual taxes as part of anti-base-erosion measures.
We close by noting that our results are generated in a static setting, and thus
ignore some interesting dynamics that might affect the optimal capital income tax
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rate and should be the subject of further research. For example, Coates (1993)
highlights the importance of imperfect capital mobility in a repeated game, arguing
that the relative immobility of capital that could be attracted to a region puts further
downward pressure on the capital income tax rate. However, the overall impact
of dynamic considerations on capital tax competition is not obvious. Cardarelli,
Taugourdeau, and Vidal (2002) acknowledge the reality that competition for mobile
capital is a repeated game and consider the potential impacts of cooperation in rate
setting. By employing trigger strategies, countries may be able to increase capital
taxes simultaneously, raising revenue without generating capital outflows — although
the gains from cooperation are limited by asymmetry between countries.
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Chapter 4
The EITC and the Labor Supply of Adult
Dependents:
Direct Effects and Family Income Effects
4.1 Introduction
In 2014, over 13 million non-child individuals were claimed as dependents in the
United States, with this type of claim appearing on approximately 1 in every 15 re-
turns.1 These claims, if made legally, represent very low-income individuals (earning
less than $3,950 in 2014) receiving the majority of their financial support from the
primary filers who claimed them. Since these individuals have very low income lev-
els, small changes in tax liability can generate sizable welfare effects. Despite these
considerations, little is known about how taxes affect the labor supply of non-child
dependents. Acknowledging this, I use the 1993 expansion of the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) to study how taxation affects their labor force participation decisions.
Two features of the 1993 EITC expansion potentially affected adult dependents.
First, for dependents attached to low-income households, family credits could have
increased by as much as $1,017, changing family income and the value of dependent
labor force participation. Second, starting in 1994, individuals without children could
claim up to $306 in wage subsidies under the credit. This credit for childless individ-
uals generally follows the form of the credit for filers with children. The value starts
at $0 for individuals without wage income and increases proportionately with wages
until reaching its maximum value. Then, for higher-wage individuals, the credit be-
1These numbers are based on the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income Table 2.3.
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gins to be phased out. For example, in 1994, no childless individuals earning $9,000
or more could claim the EITC. Noting these two relevant changes, I look for evidence
that the expansion affected labor force participation for three separate categories of
dependents: adult children living with their parents (who are too old to be “child
dependents”), older individuals living with their children, and non-nuclear relatives.
I find that the 1993 reform increased the labor force participation for non-nuclear,
adult dependents by about 5 percentage points. In contrast, for adult children, I
find that the absence of a net response to the EITC expansion is likely due to a pre-
viously undocumented effect: increases in family credits decreased their labor force
participation.2
To identify these effects, I use difference-in-differences estimation and data from
the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population
Survey (CPS), which observes more than 28,000 potential adult dependents between
1991 and 1996. I use difference-in-differences estimation for studying the labor supply
response of working-age dependents because, due in part to the EITC, these individ-
uals can have highly complex budget constraints.3 Using this methodology to study
the effects of the EITC has considerable precedent. Eissa and Liebman (1996) use
the 1987 expansion of the EITC to identify an increase in labor force participation
among single women with children, while Eissa and Hoynes (2004) demonstrate that
the 1993 EITC expansions led to a decrease in labor force participation by married
women.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the 1993 EITC expansion and
its predicted impacts. Section 4.3 discusses the sample selection methodology applied
to the Current Population Survey and resulting sample characteristics. Section 4.4
studies labor force participation responses using difference-in-differences methodology.
2My observation that family resources may affect dependent labor supply decisions aligns with
Hahn and Yang (2016), who demonstrate that access to parental health insurance reduces the labor
supply of young adults.
3For more discussion of the issues raised by nonlinear budget constraints, see Blomquist (1996).
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Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Policy Changes Under OBRA 1993
This empirical study examines the labor supply response of potential adult de-
pendents, focusing on the impact of the EITC expansion included in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993). Before and after the reform, the
EITC acted as a wage subsidy for eligible individuals, following a consistent general
structure. With no credit available for non-workers, the value of the refundable credit
increases linearly with earned income until reaching a maximum credit value. Individ-
uals are eligible for this maximum credit over a range of incomes, but it is eventually
phased out as the filer’s income continues to rise. For example, in 1993 a filer with
two qualifying children received a 19.5 percent credit on earned income up to $7,750.
For filers earning between $7,750 and $12,200, the credit was a constant $1,511. For
incomes above $12,200, the credit began phasing out at a 13.93 percent rate, so that
filers earning more than $23,050 were not eligible for the EITC.
While the general shape of the EITC schedule was unaffected by OBRA 1993, the
reform did include two notable EITC expansions. First, OBRA 1993 increased the
maximum credit for filers with EITC-qualifying children. Between 1993 and 1994,
the maximum credit increased by $604 for filers with one qualifying child and $1,017
for filers with two qualifying children. Consequently, this expansion could notably
change after-tax family income for dependents in families with qualifying children.4
Second, starting in 1994, this reform enabled childless filers to claim some EITC, with
a maximum credit of $306 given to filers earning between $4,000 and $5,000.
Due to the 1994 extension of the EITC to childless individuals, forgoing depen-
dent status and filing separately potentially minimized a family’s tax burden for the
first time. The optimality of separate filing is determined by two considerations: the
4Historical EITC parameters going back to 1975 can be obtained from the Tax Policy Center at
http://tpcprod.urban.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=36.
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family’s tax savings from claiming an additional dependent and the refundable cred-
its the dependent individual can claim when filing separately. Importantly, the tax
savings associated with an additional dependent is largely determined by the family’s
income. For very low-income families, including any families where the primary filers
can claim the EITC, an additional dependent claim produces no tax savings. For
higher-income families, the value of an additional claim is capped by the product
of the top marginal tax rate and the personal exemption, implying an approximate
maximum value of $970 in 1994. Since the maximum value of the EITC for child-
less individuals falls somewhere between these values, the dependent’s optimal filing
status varies with family income. Figure 4.1 demonstrates this divide, showing the
tax savings associated with an additional dependent claim across a range of family
incomes. This figure assumes that the dependent could claim the maximum EITC
credit for childless individuals. Consequently, savings is negative over very low family
income levels beginning in 1994.5
There is one additional way in which OBRA 1993 may have affected dependent
individuals: the law increased marginal tax rates for very high-income filers. Begin-
ning with 1993 returns, OBRA 1993 added top rates of 36 percent and 39.6 percent,
while the previous top marginal tax rate on wage income was 31 percent. For filers
affected by the increased top marginal tax rates, the value of claiming dependents
increased, reducing the value of potential dependents earning above the dependent
threshold. I ignore this last aspect of OBRA 1993 in the studies below because it
affected relatively few households — only married couples (single individuals, heads
of household) with taxable income exceeding $140,000 ($115,000, $127,500). Indeed,
within my sample, this change is unlikely to affect many individuals. Between 1990
and 1992, only 127 out of 15,173 potential dependents are attached to a family that
would be, holding income constant, affected by the marginal tax rate increases.6
5Negative values in Figure 4.1 suggest the individual filing separately minimizes the family’s tax
liability.
6For these calculations, I assume that no adult dependents are claimed by the primary family.
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Figure 4.1 : Historical Tax Savings from Claiming a Dependent Eligible for the Max-
imum (No-Child) EITC
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Tax savings shown are for a married couple filing jointly, with one dependent child. Grey lines
indicate pretreatment years, and black lines indicate post-treatment years. Tax savings are calculated
as the difference in total family tax liability between the individual being claimed as a dependent and
filing separately. Negative values reflect positive credits claimed by the dependent if filing separately.
Assumes the potential dependent can claim the full value of the EITC for single individuals with no
children.
4.3 Sample Methodology and Characteristics
Successful estimation of dependent labor supply responses requires careful identi-
fication of these individuals. Under the U.S. tax system, individuals could be claimed
as dependents during 1991–1996 so long as: (1) they lived with the primary filer(s),
(2) they received more than half of all support from the primary filer(s), (3) they did
not file jointly with another individual,7 (4) their income did not exceed the value of
If the dependents of interest were claimed, this would only further reduce the possibility that the
primary filer(s) would be affected by the tax bracket changes.
7There are some exceptions to this for dependent children. More details are provided in IRS
Publication 17, Chapter 3.
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the personal exemption, and (5) they were a U.S. citizen or resident alien. Alterna-
tively, nuclear relatives (parent, sibling, or child) could be claimed as dependents if
they met all of the previous qualifications except for (1); nuclear relatives do not have
to reside with the primary filer(s). Using the ASEC sample of individuals from March
CPS surveys between 1991 and 1996,8 I identify potential dependents as unmarried
relatives over the age of 18 (or 24 if the individual is a child of a primary filer) residing
with the primary family. Spouses and siblings of the head are both excluded from the
sample of potential dependents. I exclude siblings because selection of a household
head between siblings may be arbitrary. Finally, I exclude all married individuals
from the set of potential dependents.
I apply a few additional exclusion rules to the sample population. I exclude in-
dividuals who are active in the military, as it is unlikely these individuals choose
their short-term labor supply in response to changes in net wage or family income.
I also exclude individuals with obvious errors in their CPS survey results, including
individuals with negative earned income, positive earned income paired with no labor
supply, and individuals with no recorded labor force status. I further exclude indi-
viduals with likely errors in either age or relationship to the household head: children
(of the household head) over the age of 65 and parents (of the household head) under
the age of 40.9 Accounting for these restrictions, the sample includes 28,672 potential
dependents between 1991 and 1996. Within the sample, 18,786 individuals identify
as children,10 4,066 identify as parents, and 5,820 identify as an “other relative.”
The last category excludes relatives who are spouses, children, parents, siblings, or
grandchildren, and consequently, they are referred to as non-nuclear family members
throughout this paper. Economic indicators for non-nuclear family members suggest
that they may be residing with the family due to financial need. Only approximately
40 percent of these individuals report working in the week prior to the interview, and
8I extracted CPS data using IPUMS-CPS (Flood et al., 2015).
9Neither of these restrictions has a notable impact on the results.
10Step children are counted as children throughout this paper.
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over 70 percent of them report working fewer than 50 weeks in the prior year.
The characteristics of this sample are described in Table 4.1. Within the sample,
children are generally the youngest potential dependents and parents are generally
the oldest. While racial identification does not vary widely by the type of dependent,
older potential dependents (parents and non-nuclear relatives) are more likely to be
female and more likely to be attached to families with EITC-qualifying children.
Unearned income is generally lower for children and higher for parents, while the
opposite is true for earned income. Lastly, a larger proportion of children reside in
families where the head has a high school education or less.
Of course, individuals whose taxable income exceeds the personal exemption can-
not actually be claimed as dependents. If the sample is composed of individuals
whose income drastically exceeds the level of the personal exemption, the dependent
tax structure described thus far would not reasonably predict their behavior. With
this concern in mind, I also observe each individual’s taxable income relative to the
concurrent personal exemption.11 This reveals that a minority (26 percent) of identi-
fied children earn little enough income to be claimed as a dependent, but a majority
of parents and non-nuclear relatives can be claimed as dependents. These values
may understate the true proportion of individuals who consider dependency status
if individuals fail to report some income when filing, especially if this misreporting
is chosen strategically to maintain dependency status.12 Further, individuals may
consider the potential value of being claimed as a dependent and still decide to work
at levels which eliminate eligibility. In combination, these two effects make it difficult
to determine what proportion of the sample may consider dependency status. As an
indication of the sample density around the eligibility cutoff, note that more than
11Taxable income is calculated using total income less retirement income, survivor’s benefits, and
disability benefits, provided the sum of these deductions is under $25,000. I also deduct worker’s
compensation if the individual does not receive social security or social security insurance, and social
security income if the individual’s total income is under $25,000. Personal exemptions and standard
deductions are not deducted.
12Evidence of strategic income reporting can be found in LaLumia (2009) and Saez (2010).
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42 percent of children, 70 percent of non-nuclear relatives, and 85 percent of parents
have income less than four times the eligibility cutoff.
One remaining family characteristic, EITC-qualifying children, is important to the
estimation below, since the number of children can have a significant impact on the
EITC-eligibility of the primary filer(s). Children younger than 19, or younger than
24 and in school, may be claimed as dependents for EITC filing so long as they live
with the primary filer(s), receive more than half of their support from the primary
filer(s), and do not file a separate return. Thus, when calculating the number of
EITC-qualifying children in a family, I include all unmarried individuals who identify
as a child of the household head and are younger than 19 or younger than 24 and in
school.
4.4 Estimation and Results
This empirical study examines the labor force participation response of the po-
tentially dependent individuals identified above, focusing on the impact of the EITC
expansion included in OBRA 1993. As discussed in Section 4.2, this reform is ex-
pected to affect dependent labor force participation through two channels. First,
OBRA 1993 extended the EITC program to individuals without qualifying children.
Because this program acted as a wage subsidy to childless individuals, it is expected
to increase their labor force participation. Second, the expansion increased credits
for household heads with EITC-qualifying children. If these credits lead to an overall
increase in household income and this increase was shared with dependents, this is ex-
pected to decrease dependent labor force participation. Consequently, the predicted
effect of the expansion on labor force participation is theoretically ambiguous.
The ambiguity of the predicted effect is compounded by the observation that
increases in credits may not increase family income. Expansions of the EITC have
been shown to increase labor force participation by married men and single individuals
(Dickert, Houser, and Scholz, 1995), while decreasing participation by married women
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(Eissa and Hoynes, 2004). In fact, Eissa and Hoynes find that OBRA 1993’s EITC
expansion lead to an overall decrease in labor force participation among married
couples. Further, EITC expansion may increase or decrease hours for people who are
already working, even for primary earners.13 Consequently, theoretical models cannot
predict whether family income will increase or decrease in response to an expansion
of the EITC. Nevertheless, the expansion of family credits should affect the labor
supply of adult dependents as long as a portion of the family income change is passed
on to the dependent.
4.4.1 The Net Impact of the EITC Expansion
Noting the multiple changes to the EITC included in OBRA 1993, I start by
studying the net effect of the policy change on the labor supply of adult dependents.
To do this, I compare labor force participation for individuals attached to low-income
households to participation for those attached to higher-income households using
difference-in-differences estimation. Only individuals attached to low-income house-
holds are expected to be affected by the EITC expansion, since only low-income
household heads should experience an increase in credits and only dependents at-
tached to low-income families would optimally file separately to claim the EITC (this
optimality is discussed in Section 4.2).
Recognizing that the family’s income may be endogenously affected by tax reforms,
I study the net effects of the reform using three alternative proxies for family income:
the head’s education, family homeownership status, and reported capital income.
For each family income proxy, I present a direct comparison of changes in labor force
13See U.S. GAO (1993) for an extensive discussion of the predicted effects of the EITC and Saez
(2010) for an exploration of intensive-margin effects using a sample of U.S. tax returns.
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participation as well as two full regressions of the form
Pi,t = α1 {fam. inc. indicator}i × 1 {period}t + β1 {fam. inc. indicator}i (4.1)
+γDt + δDs + µXi,t + i,t,
where Pi,t is the individual’s participation decision (1 indicates participation, 0 in-
dicates non-participation); 1 {fam. inc. indicator}i is the family income indicator (1
indicates the low-income proxy and 0 the indicates high-income proxy); 1 {period}t
is the period indicator (1 indicates post-reform, 0 indicates pre-reform); Dt is the set
of year fixed effects; Ds is the set of state fixed effects, Xi,t is the vector of control
variables; and i,t is the error term. The vector Xi,t includes controls for gender,
age, race, unearned income, the number of EITC-qualifying children in the family,
education, and the state unemployment rate.14,15
Under the first proxy, low-income households are approximated by households
where the head’s education does not exceed a high school degree; among these house-
holds the average family income is $23,386. Higher-income households are approxi-
mated by households where the head’s education exceeds a high school degree; among
these households the average family income is $45,839. This suggests using the head’s
education roughly splits families according to family income using an indicator that
is unlikely to be affected by changes in tax law. However, this proxy may present its
own challenges, particularly if the household head’s education affects how dependents
respond to tax changes. If there is a perfect association between the head’s education
and family income, the high-education group does not experience a tax change, and
all of the measured response should be a consequence of the EITC expansion (where
the magnitude of this response is scaled by the influence of a low-education head).
14Kaplan (2012) shows that employment rates can be important in determining coresidence deci-
sions.
15State unemployment statistics were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor of Statistics (1988–
2000). Values are March seasonally adjusted unemployment rates.
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However, if some high-education heads are affected by the EITC policy change and
their associated dependents respond in a manner opposite to individuals attached
to low-education heads, this could lead to an overestimate of the EITC’s impact.16
Recognizing this concern, I use TAXSIM to estimate family tax liability in each house-
hold with and without an additional dependent exemption.17 Using these estimates,
I find that only 6.8 percent of high-education household heads in my sample could
plausibly claim EITC credits. Further, only 13.5 percent of dependents attached to
high-education heads would optimally file separately, assuming the maximum credit
amount of $306.
The second proxy I use for family income is the family’s homeownership sta-
tus. Homeownership, like the head’s education, is relatively difficult to adjust in
response to a tax change and correlated with income (in my sample average family
income among non-homeowners is $18,460; average family income among homeown-
ers is $34,320). However, rental and purchasing decisions can vary significantly geo-
graphically. If geographic location affects the direction of a dependent’s response to
tax changes, and some individuals in homeowning families are affected by the EITC
change, this could lead to overestimation. Again using TAXSIM to estimate liability, I
find that only 5.8 percent of homeowning households could plausibly claim the EITC,
but that 20.5 percent of dependents attached to these households would optimally
file separately.
The last proxy I use for family income is reported capital income. While the level of
capital income reported is likely to be affected by taxation, I rely only on the presence
of capital income (positive or negative) to distinguish between low- and high-income
families. This eliminates endogeneity concerns as long as completely eliminating cap-
ital income is sufficiently costly. Under this approach, I approximate low-income
households with households where the primary filers report no capital income; among
16If dependents attached to high-education heads respond in the same manner, but to a differing
extent, this would lead to underestimated effects.
17For more discussion of the TAXSIM model, see Feenberg and Coutts (1993).
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these households, the average family income is $21,523. Among households which
report non-zero capital income, the average family income is $32,609. The primary
limitation of this proxy comes from the imperfect separation of low- and high-income
families: capital income reporting can be very noisy and may only reflect differences
in the type of income earned. These concerns may explain why capital income gen-
erates the narrowest family income difference. However, unless individuals attached
to families with capital investments respond differently (in direction, not degree) to
a tax change, noisy group assignments will only bias estimates towards zero.
Table 4.2 presents the change in labor force participation before and after the
reform for potential dependents attached to low- and higher-income families, where
Pi,t = 1 if the individual reports active labor force participation. Using these changes,
Table 4.2 then presents the difference-in-differences estimate with no controls. These
observations suggest that responses to the EITC expansion varied according to family
interrelationship. The naive results using the head’s education suggest that parents
and non-nuclear relatives increased their labor force participation in response to the
EITC expansion, a change that can be explained by these dependents choosing to
forgo dependency status and claiming their new-found wage subsidies. On the other
hand, the naive results using family capital income suggest that children may have
exited the labor force, plausibly as a consequence of increases in family credits.
To test the validity of these naive results, I present a few robustness checks in
Table 4.3. First, I adjust the standard errors for clustering at the state level and
incorporate control variables, including state and year fixed effects. Broadly, these
considerations do not affect the sign of the results presented in Table 4.2, although
the significance of the results declines for both parents and children. Second, I repeat
the uncontrolled regression estimation using an alternative indicator for labor force
participation: positive reported labor hours in the week before the survey was taken.
Using this alternative indicator, with and without controls, the significance of the
non-nuclear relative response remains at the 1% level with the head-education family
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Table 4.2 : Labor Force Participation Changes Using Family Income Proxies
A comparison of labor force participation between dependents attached to
low-income families (the treated group) and those attached to higher-income
families (the untreated group).
Children Parents Non-Nuclear
Treated = Head’s Education ≤ High School Degree
∆Participation for the treated -0.024 0.053 0.024
(0.007) (0.016) (0.016)
∆Participation for the untreated -0.012 -0.011 -0.091
(0.010) (0.018) (0.021)
DD estimate (α) -0.012 0.064*** 0.115***
(0.013) (0.024) (0.027)
Treated = No Homeownership
∆Participation for the treated -0.022 0.031 -0.003
(0.016) (0.024) (0.021)
∆Participation for the untreated -0.016 0.020 -0.034
(0.006) (0.013) (0.016)
DD estimate (α) -0.006 0.011 0.031
(0.015) (0.025) (0.026)
Treated = Zero Capital Income
∆Participation for the treated -0.059 0.028 -0.009
(0.017) (0.027) (0.024)
∆Participation for the untreated -0.012 0.015 -0.032
(0.006) (0.013) (0.015)
DD estimate (α) -0.047*** 0.013 0.023
(0.017) (0.027) (0.029)
Participation is measured using reported labor force status. All changes compare par-
ticipation rates between 1991–1993 and 1994–1996. Significance is indicated at the 1%
(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
income proxy. Additionally, using reported hours worked, the non-nuclear relative
response is significant at the 5% level using the family homeownership proxy. In
contrast, using an alternative labor force participation proxy for parents and children
weakens the significance of their responses, with no evidence of a response when
control variables are included. Overall, Table 4.3 only provides robust evidence that
non-nuclear relatives increased their labor force participation in response to the EITC
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Table 4.3 : Robustness Checks on Labor Force Participation Changes Using Family
Income Proxies
A comparison of labor force participation between dependents attached to low-
income families (the treated group) and those attached to higher-income families
(the untreated group).
Child Parent Non-Nuclear
Treated = Head’s Education ≤ High School Degree
DD estimate (α) with controls -0.007 0.029* 0.053***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017)
DD estimate (α) using reported hrs -0.014 0.053** 0.115***
(0.015) (0.023) (0.026)
DD estimate (α) reported hrs, controls -0.011 0.021 0.061***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.015)
Treated = No Homeownership
DD estimate (α) with controls 0.004 -0.003 0.019
(0.021) (0.025) (0.021)
DD estimate (α) using reported hrs 0.014 0.012 0.053**
(0.018) (0.024) (0.026)
DD estimate (α) reported hrs, controls 0.025 -0.002 0.044**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.020)
Treated = Zero Capital Income
DD estimate (α) with controls -0.027 0.016 0.036
(0.019) (0.017) (0.030)
DD estimate (α) using reported hrs -0.040* 0.024 0.012
(0.021) (0.026) (0.029)
DD estimate (α) reported hrs, controls -0.017 0.026 0.026
(0.021) (0.019) (0.034)
“Reported hrs” indicates Participation uses hours worked in the previous week rather than
reported labor force status. All changes compare participation rates between 1991–1993 and
1994–1996. Control variables include unearned income, education, age, the number of EITC-
qualifying children in the family, state unemployment, state and year fixed effects, and gender
and race indicators. Significance is indicated at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level.
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expansion.18 Based on the estimates in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, it appears that these
individuals increased their labor force participation by about 5 percentage points in
response to the EITC expansion. This value is somewhat higher than the effect found
for single women (3.3 percentage points) by Dickert, Houser, and Scholz (1995).
Concentrating on the effects observed for non-nuclear relatives, two concerns need
to be addressed. First, any difference-in-differences regression is subject to concern
that the trends over time for each group are inherently different and that any signifi-
cance picked up in these regressions is merely a consequence of pre-existing trends. To
address this concern, I test for differential trends in labor force participation between
the treated and untreated group between 1988 and 1993. These tests are performed
for non-nuclear relatives with and without controls. They fail to reject the null hy-
pothesis that dependent labor force participation followed the same trend regardless
of the head’s education level or family homeownership status. The trends in labor
force participation are depicted in Figure 4.2.
Second, since the CPS survey only covers individuals living in the household, it is
possible that OBRA 1993 changed living arrangements, biasing the results in Table
4.3. This problem is highlighted by McElroy (1985), who emphasizes that living at
home cannot be treated as an exogenous variable. While Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1994) find that welfare has little effect on coresidence decisions, Kaplan (2012) finds
that coresidence and employment are likely jointly determined. Further, the effect
of employment on the decision to the leave the household appears to vary with the
quality of employment (e.g., wages and job security) as shown by Card and Lemieux
(2000) and Becker et al. (2010). Consequently, if OBRA 1993 encouraged changes in
labor force participation, it may have also produced changes in housing decisions.19
18Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) find that government transfers are partial substitutes for family
support. In this case, it is possible that children do not respond to an increase in their own credits
because they are countered by a decrease in family support.
19Labor force participation and job quality are only two of several factors that may affect the
decision to leave the household. Other factors include age (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Ahn and
Sanchez-Marcos, forthcoming); sibling relationships (Aparicio-Fenoll and Oppedisano, 2016); mort-
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Figure 4.2 : Participation Trends and Sample Sizes for Non-Nuclear Relatives
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Labor force participation rates are presented for sampled dependent individuals.
To provide an indication of any change in living arrangements, I graph the percent
of families reporting a non-nuclear dependent by type between 1988 and 2000 in Figure
4.2. This figure does not reveal any evidence of a notable shift in living arrangements
around the reform, although in 1994 there is a one-year dip in reported non-nuclear
relatives for households with a high-education head. In combination, changes in
participation and observation rates leave little reason to doubt the result found in
Tables 4.2 and 4.3: Non-nuclear relatives increased their labor force participation
in response to the 1993 EITC expansion. There are two plausible explanations for
this change. First, these individuals may have increased their participation to take
gage interest rates (Martins and Villanueva, 2009); and family resources (Rosenzweig and Wolpin,
1993; Manacorda and Moretti, 2006; Battistin et al., 2009; Stella, forthcoming).
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advantage of their new-found eligibility for the EITC. Alternatively, these individuals
may have increased their participation due to decreases in family income generated
by large labor responses from other family members. Since any decrease in labor
supply would have to overwhelm increased EITC benefits, I hypothesize that these
individuals increased their labor force participation in response to their own EITC
eligibility. This hypothesis is explored in the following section, where I study labor
supply responses to increased family credits.
4.4.2 Dependent Responses to Changes in Family Tax Liability
As noted above, the EITC expansion had two primary effects on dependent indi-
viduals: It made them newly eligible to claim EITC benefits, and it expanded benefits
for primary filers. In an effort to disentangle these effects, I compare individuals based
on the presence of EITC-qualifying children in the household. Low-income families
with EITC-qualifying children experienced the largest increases in EITC benefits un-
der OBRA 1993. With no children, the maximum credit increased by $306 between
1993 and 1994. With one child, the maximum credit increased by $604 between
1993 and 1994. With two or more children, the maximum credit increased by $1,017
between 1993 and 1994. While EITC-qualifying children were associated with a sig-
nificant expansion of family EITC benefits, they had a small impact on the optimality
of claiming a dependent (relative to letting the dependent file separately). In 1994,
an optimizing married couple without an EITC-qualifying child would always claim
a dependent at incomes exceeding $13,287; an optimizing married couple with one
qualifying child would always claim a dependent at incomes exceeding $15,737. Con-
sequently, while EITC-qualifying children have a significant effect on tax liability for
low-income families, they should have little effect on the tax filing decision for any
associated dependents.
In this section I compare the labor force participation response for dependents
using EITC-qualifying children as an indicator of expanded family credits. This
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comparison follows the form of the regression specified in (4.1), with two changes:
the treated group includes only individuals attached to families with EITC-qualifying
children, and the vector of control variables, Xi,t, no longer includes the number of
EITC-qualifying children. Accounting for these changes, the regressions studying the
impact of expanded credits have the form
Pi,t = α1 {qual. children}i × 1 {period}t + β1 {qual. children}i (4.2)
+γDt + δDs + µXi,t + i,t.
Under the specification in (4.2), the α coefficient should capture the impact of ex-
panded benefits for families with EITC-qualifying children on the labor force partici-
pation of dependents. Because EITC-qualifying children only affect family credits for
low-income households, I restrict this comparison to families with married household
heads whose education does not exceed the high school level.
The results from comparing potential dependents attached to families with and
without EITC-qualifying children are included in Table 4.4. These results suggest
that an increase in family EITC credits decreased labor force participation for adult
children. For parents and non-nuclear relatives, estimation does not produce robust
evidence that individuals responded to changes in family credits.20 As a consequence,
the most reasonable explanation of the results in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 is that non-
nuclear relatives increased their labor supply in response to their own expanded EITC
eligibility, not in response to changes in family income.
To address the concern that these results for adult children may be driven by
differential underlying trends in participation or changes in living arrangements, I
20The limited response among parental dependents could be explained in one of two ways. First,
increases in family wealth may be shared less with parents. Alternatively, the limited response may
be a consequence of complex childcare decisions for parents of the household head. Wheelock and
Jones (2002) find that grandparents may exchange childcare for support from their children. Aassve,
Meroni, and Pronzato (2012) find that the availability of grandparents for childcare affects family
planning.
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Table 4.4 : Dependent Labor Force Participation by Predicted Family EITC Increase
A comparison of labor force participation between dependents attached to families
with EITC-qualifying children (the treated group) and those attached to families
without (the untreated group).
Child Parent Non-Nuclear
∆Participation for the treated -0.051 0.016 0.014
(0.022) (0.036) (0.028)
∆Participation for the untreated -0.006 0.047 0.039
(0.010) (0.033) (0.028)
DD estimate (α) without controls -0.045* -0.031 -0.025
(0.025) (0.051) (0.040)
DD estimate (α) with controls -0.064** -0.055 0.038
(0.029) (0.034) (0.027)
DD estimate (α) using reported hrs -0.067** -0.052 -0.009
(0.030) (0.048) (0.039)
DD estimate (α) reported hrs, controls -0.075** -0.075** 0.047*
(0.033) (0.031) (0.028)
Significance is indicated at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels; reported standard errors cluster
at the state level. “Reported hrs” indicates Participation uses hours worked in the previous week
rather than reported labor force status. All changes compare particpation rates between 1991–1993
and 1994-1996. Control variables include unearned income, education, age (linear and quadratic
terms), state unemployment rates, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and indicators for gender
and race (black and white). Observations are restricted to families with a married household head
whose education does not exceed a high school degree.
perform validity tests using comparison groups that align with Table 4.4. Studying
the labor force participation of adult children over 1988–1993, tests fail to reject the
null hypothesis that labor force participation followed the same trend for individuals
in families with and without EITC-qualifying children. These labor force participa-
tion patterns are depicted in Figure 4.3. Since I do not find evidence of underlying
differential trends for adult children, this observation does not undermine the signif-
icant results noted in Table 4.4.
To investigate the possibility that changes in living arrangements biased results, I
again calculate the percent of families reporting dependents between 1988 and 2000.
As depicted in Figure 4.3, observation rates for dependent adult children were fairly
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Figure 4.3 : Participation Trends and Sample Sizes Using EITC-Qualifying Children
as a Proxy for Family Credits
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“No Family Credit” indicates the dependent belongs to a family without EITC-qualifying children;
these families are not expected to experience a significant EITC increase. “Family Credit” indicates
the dependent belongs to a family with at least one EITC-qualifying child; these families are expected
to experience a significant credit increase.
constant between 1990 and 1996. There is a slight decline in the rate of dependent
adult children living at home beginning in 1995 for families without EITC-qualifying
children. Assuming that dependents who move out of the home are more likely to
work, an assumption which aligns with the results found by both Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (1993) and Kaplan (2012), this suggests sample observations over 1995–1996
understate labor force participation for adult children in the untreated group.21 This
21Kaplan (2012) thinks about the decisions to move back home as a consequence of labor market
outcomes. From this perspective, he finds that youths who become unemployed are 63 percent more
likely to move in with their parents. Similarly, employment increases the likelihood of moving out
by 27 percent.
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is similar to overestimating participation in the treated group — it generates upwards
bias in the α coefficient. Since the coefficient values reported in Table 4.4 for adult
children are significantly negative, a potential upwards bias in the coefficient should
not be driving the result. On the whole, review of Figure 4.3 offers little reason to
doubt the suggestion that an increase in family credits led to a decrease in labor force
participation for adult children.
One explanation for the negative labor supply response of adult children is that
the EITC expansion led to a net increase in family income, which was then shared
with adult children. An EITC expansion leading to an increase in family income is
broadly consistent with the existing literature. Eissa and Liebman (1996), Meyer and
Rosenbaum (2001), and Saez (2010) all suggest limited intensive margin responses to
the EITC. Chetty, Friedman, and Saez (2013) find an intensive margin response for
individuals in areas generally knowledgeable about the EITC. So, while well-informed
individuals may be likely to adjust their hours in response to the EITC, the literature
suggests a small overall response in hours worked. There is less evidence that increases
in family income are shared with adult children. Rosenweig and Wolpin (1994) find
that changes in family income have minimal effects on transfers to children and suggest
that this may be because household heads face fewer liquidity constraints and smooth
consumption over time. However, consumption smoothing opportunities are likely to
be more limited for very low-income families. For example, Rosenweig and Wolpin
(1993) find evidence that, in black families where the mother has less than eight years
of schooling, changes in family income affect transfers to adult children.
4.5 Conclusion
Using the EITC expansions introduced in OBRA 1993, this paper provides an
initial exploration of the impact of taxes on the labor supply decisions of dependent
individuals. In this study, I differentiate between dependents based on their relation-
ship to the household head, finding different responses across categories. Relatives
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living with extended family, who identify as neither a parent nor a child of the house-
hold head, increased their labor supply by about 5 percentage points in response to
the 1993 EITC expansion. Decomposing the EITC expansion, I find an increase in
the family’s EITC benefits decreased labor force participation for adult children. This
observation suggests the absence of a net effect for adult children may be due to the
two offsetting features of the EITC expansion under OBRA 1993. The expansion in-
creased family income, discouraging labor force participation for dependents, but also
extended EITC eligibility to these individuals, encouraging labor force participation.
Since this study relies on difference-in-differences estimation centering around a
single policy change, any concurrent reform could bias the results, particularly if the
reform differentially affected individuals based on family income or the presence of
EITC-qualifying children in the household. Indeed, several major pieces of federal
legislation were passed in the early 1990s, and a few of these reforms should be noted.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect January 1,
1994. If NAFTA generated rapid changes in the U.S. job market it could bias the
above results, although controlling for state unemployment rates should attenuate
any such bias. The Family and Medical Leave Act took effect in August of 1993,
protecting unpaid leave for individuals caring for new children or sick nuclear relatives.
While this protection is particularly relevant for dependents with poor health, these
dependents are typically unable to work and I do not expect policy changes to impact
their labor force participation. Lastly, starting in 1993, the federal government began
to issue welfare waivers to some states. Under these waivers, states were able to adjust
their Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs. These adjustments
took many forms and often included increases in job-training program requirements,
new eligibility time-limits, increases in disregarded income, and increases in resource
limits. Since these reforms were diverse and staggered between 1993 and 1996, it is
difficult to discern their effect on the results identified here.
The evidence in this paper provides a few lessons for future revisions to EITC
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benefits. First, since the EITC expansion influenced the labor supply decisions of
dependent individuals, future reforms should not only weigh the value of the EITC
to primary and secondary earners, but also to tertiary earners attached to primary
filers. Notably, estimates of the EITC cost for this group may be overstated if they
ignore any associated decreases in dependent claims. Second, by simultaneously ad-
justing credits for filers with and without children, future EITC reforms can minimize
participation-discouraging effects on adult children. The importance of this consid-
eration depends on why adult children decrease their labor supply in response to an
increase in family income. If labor force exit represents a decrease in human capital
development, discouraging labor force participation for adult children may be excep-
tionally inefficient. However, if the decline in participation reflects an extended job
search process due to relaxed liquidity constraints, similar to the impacts of unem-
ployment insurance observed by Chetty (2008) or the effective insurance of living with
parents observed by Kaplan (2012), decreased participation may be a desirable con-
sequence of the EITC. Differentiating these two effects is an important consideration
for future research, as they affect the optimal level of EITC benefits for filers with
and without children.
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A.1 Chapter 1 Appendices
A.1.1 Consumption and Leisure Responses to Taxation
Applying the Slutsky decomposition for consumption and leisure, the individual’s
response to either tax can be characterized with
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l1t ,wt + ψh1t ηl1t
)
+
(
1
pt
∂pt
∂τ
)(
l1t ,pt − ψc1t ηl1t
)
(A.3)
+
(
1
wDt+1
∂wDt+1
∂τ
)(
l1t ,wDt+1 + ψh2t+1ηl1t
)
+
(
1
pDt+1
∂pDt+1
∂τ
)(
l1t ,pDt+1 − ψc2t+1ηl1t
)
1
l2t+1
∂l2t+1
∂τ
=
(
1
wDt+1
∂wDt+1
∂τ
)(
l2t+1,wDt+1 + ψh2t+1ηl2t+1
)
(A.4)
+
(
1
pDt+1
∂pDt+1
∂τ
)(
l2t+1,pDt+1 − ψc2t+1ηl2t+1
)
+
(
1
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)(
l2t+1,wt + ψh1t ηl2t+1
)
+
(
1
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∂pt
∂τ
)(
l2t+1,pt − ψc1t ηl2t+1
)
,
where cit,P is the compensated elasticity of demand for c
i
t with respect to price P ,
lit,P is compensated elasticity of demand for l
i
t with respect to price P , ψcit is the
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individual’s expenditure share on cit as a fraction of potential income wtT
1 +wDt+1T
2,
ψhit is the individual’s income from h
i
t as a fraction of potential income, ηcit is the
income elasticity of cit, and ηlit is the income elasticity of l
i
t.
A.1.2 Residence-based Taxation and the Inter-temporal Elasticity of Sub-
stitution
The savings response to residence-based taxation can generally be written as
1
bt
∂bt
∂τI
=
wtl
1
t
bt
(
1
wt
∂wt
∂τI
− 1
l1t
∂l1t
∂τI
)
− ptc
1
t
bt
(
1
c1t
∂c1t
∂τI
+
1
pt
∂pt
∂τI
)
. (A.5)
Accounting for price responses (2.29), (2.30), (2.40), and (2.44) as well as the indi-
vidual responses in (A.1) and (A.3), this suggests the savings response in the small
open economy is
1
bt
∂bt
∂τI
= − ρt+1
(
1− φIt+1
)
1 + ρNt+1
(
wtl
1
t
bt
)(
l1t ,wDt+1 + l1t ,pDt+1 − ψbtηl1t
)
(A.6)
− ρt+1
(
1− φIt+1
)
1 + ρNt+1
(
ptc
1
t
bt
)(
c1t ,wDt+1 + c1t ,pDt+1 − ψbtηc1t
)
,
where ψbt is the ratio of savings to the individual’s total potential income, wtT
1 +
wDt+1T
2. In this expression c1t ,pDt+1 captures the inter-temporal elasticity of substi-
tution, which is inversely related to the elasticity of savings with respect to the
residence-based tax rate.
Alternatively, applying the partially open economy price responses (2.57) and
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(2.60), the savings response to the residence-based tax is
1
bt
∂bt
∂τI
= −χrdt
(
θKt
θLt
)
wtl
1
t
bt
+ χrdt
(
θKt
θLt
)
wtl
1
t
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(
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)
(A.7)
+
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[(
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d
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)(
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](
c1t ,pDt+1 + c1t ,wDt+1 + ψbtηc1t
)
,
where ψh is the ratio of labor income to total potential income and χrdt is an abbre-
viation for
(
1
rdt
∂rdt
∂τI
)
.
A.1.3 Residence-based Taxation and Consumption-Leisure Complemen-
tarity
Using second-period leisure and consumption responses, the savings response to
residence-based taxation is
1
bt
∂bt
∂τI
=
pDt+1c
2
t+1
bt
(
1
c2t+1
∂c2t+1
∂τI
+
1
pDt+1
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)
(A.8)
+
wDt+1l
2
t+1
bt
(
1
l2t+1
∂l2t+1
∂τI
− 1
wDt+1
∂wDt+1
∂τI
)
.
Applying the small open economy price responses derived in Section 2.3 as well as
Euler’s homogeneous function theorem to the individual responses in (A.2) and (A.4),
the savings response becomes
1
bt
∂bt
∂τI
=
ρt+1
(
1− φIt+1
)
1 + ρNt+1
(
pDt+1c
2
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bt
)(
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)
(A.9)
+
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(
1− φIt+1
)
1 + ρNt+1
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wDt+1l
2
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)(
l2t+1,wDt+1 − ψbtηl2t+1
)
+
ρt+1
(
1− φIt+1
)
1 + ρNt+1
.
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In this expression c2t+1,wDt+1 captures the complementarity of second-period consump-
tion and leisure, which is clearly directly related to the elasticity of savings with
respect to the residence-based tax rate.
Similarly, in the partially open economy the savings response is given by
1
bt
∂bt
∂τI
= −w
D
t+1l
2
t+1
bt
θKt
θLt
(
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)
χrdt (A.10)
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ψbtηc2t+1 + 1
)
,
which, like (A.7), uses the definition χrdt =
(
1
rdt
∂rdt
∂τI
)
.
A.1.4 Deriving the Domestic Cost of Capital Responses to Each Tax in
the Partially Open Economy
For the purposes of notational simplicity, the response of the cost of capital deriva-
tions are all presented in steady state values. In the steady state, the response of
domestic capital investment to capital income taxation can be characterized by
1
K
∂K
∂τ
= −σθK
(
1
w
∂w
∂τ
)
− Lw
(
1
w
∂w
∂τ
)
(A.11)
− LwD
(
1
wD
∂wD
∂τ
)
− LpD
(
1
pD
∂pD
∂τ
)
, τ = τI , τF ,
where
LPx =
l1
L
ξl1,Px +
l2
L
ξl2,Px , Px = w,w
D, pD (A.12)
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and ξli,Px is the uncompensated price elasticity of l
i with respect to price Px. Similarly,
the response of domestic saving is given by
1
b
∂b
∂τ
=
(
wl1
b
+ bw
)(
1
w
∂w
∂τ
)
(A.13)
+ bwD
(
1
wD
∂wD
∂τ
)
+ bpD
(
1
pD
∂pD
∂τ
)
, τ = τI , τF ,
where
bPx =
wl1
b
ξl1,Px +
pc1
b
ξc1,Px , Px = w,w
D, pD (A.14)
and ξc1,Px is the uncompensated price elasticity of c
1 with respect to Px. Combining
these responses with the capital market-clearing condition for the partially open econ-
omy (2.54) and the price responses outlined in Section 2.4, the steady-state domestic
capital response functions are
1
rd
∂rd
∂τF
=
[
rd(1−φF )
rN
]
Ω1
bd
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(
rd
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)
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(A.15)
and
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, (A.16)
where
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(A.17)
and
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)
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)
. (A.18)
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The expressions (A.15) and (A.16) show that zB
′′
and the magnitude of the marginal
effect on the domestic cost of capital are correlated. As the economy becomes in-
creasingly open (reflected by a decrease in zB
′′
), both
∣∣ 1
rd
∂rd
∂τF
∣∣ and ∣∣ 1
rd
∂rd
∂τI
∣∣ decrease.
In combination (A.15) and (A.16) imply the relationship between the two re-
sponses can be written as
1
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∂rd
∂τF
=
[
rd
(
1− φF )
rN
ρN
ρ (1− φIt )
](
1
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(A.19)
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− r
d
(
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rN
.
As the economy becomes more closed, ρ→ rd, bd → b, and zB ′′ →∞. Consequently,
in an increasingly closed economy 1
rd
∂rd
∂τF
and 1
rd
∂rd
∂τI
become increasingly similar. The
relationship (A.19) also reveals that income sheltering decreases the relative domestic
return distortion associated with the corresponding tax. For example, if firms practice
a higher level of income sheltering and φF increases, 1
rd
∂rd
∂τF
falls relative to 1
rd
∂rd
∂τI
.
A closed economy is characterized by an infinite international shifting cost, zB
′′ →
∞, and all savings being domestically invested, bd = b and rd = ρ. Under these
conditions, the relationship between the two responses simplifies to
1
rd
∂rd
∂τF
=
[
ρN
(
1− φF )
rN (1− φI)
](
1
rd
∂rd
∂τI
)
− r
d
(
1− φF )
rN
. (A.20)
Effectively, the two responses are just scaled by the relative size of their tax bases.
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A.2 Chapter 3 Appendices
A.2.1 Demographic Trends
Figure A1 : Dependent Ages Over Time
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Treatment Group: EITC-Qualifying Child in Household
Samples are taken from the ASEC CPS using the methodology described in Section 4.3. In the
upper chart, the treated group includes individuals in families where the head’s education does not
exceed a high school degree, and the untreated group includes individuals in families where the
head had some post-secondary education, not exceeding a bachelor’s degree. In the lower chart,
the treated group includes individuals in families with EITC-qualifying children, and the untreated
group includes individuals in families without EITC-qualifying children.
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Figure A2 : Share of Dependents by Race Over Time
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Treatment Group: EITC-Qualifying Child in Household
Samples are taken from the ASEC CPS using the methodology described in Section 4.3. In the
upper chart, the treated group includes individuals in families where the head’s education does not
exceed a high school degree, and the untreated group includes individuals in families where the
head had some post-secondary education, not exceeding a bachelor’s degree. In the lower chart,
the treated group includes individuals in families with EITC-qualifying children, and the untreated
group includes individuals in families without EITC-qualifying children.
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Figure A3 : Share of Dependents by Gender Over Time
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Treatment Group: EITC-Qualifying Child
Samples are taken from the ASEC CPS using the methodology described in Section 4.3. In the
upper chart, the treated group includes individuals in families where the head’s education does not
exceed a high school degree, and the untreated group includes individuals in families where the
head had some post-secondary education, not exceeding a bachelor’s degree. In the lower chart,
the treated group includes individuals in families with EITC-qualifying children, and the untreated
group includes individuals in families without EITC-qualifying children.
